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.Butbefore the cannon fire, common sense demands a strict accounting Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense 297of alternatives and of probable consequences.Common sense adoptsdiplomatic and economic power as a means of pressuring other na-tions and to solve problems.A commonsense foreign policy boils down to five guidelines forchoosing ends and means.First, make America strong again by restoring our economic dy-namism and pragmatic, can-do spirit.Our resources and our will to help the world are the ultimatebasis of our international power.If these deteriorate, our powerabroad shrinks; it is as simple as that.To prevent this shrinkage willrequire giving far higher priority to energy independence, physicaland human infrastructure, and homeland security.The issue is whether brave new leaders will emerge to minimizeself-destructive partisanship and act together in the national interest.Second, understand clearly that mutual indispensability is thefundamental operating principle for power in the twenty-first cen-tury, meaning that the United States is the indispensable leader butneeds equally indispensable partners to succeed.In other words,succeed together or fail apart.Three points underpin this proposition: (1) the United Statesis the indispensable leader in the world and can t be replaced; (2)America s power to lead is not the power to dictate, but rather thepower to solve major international problems; and (3) America needsto form coalitions with equally indispensable partners, to add theirpower to its own.The question is whether Washington and its key partners majorglobal and regional states will show the wisdom and skills neededto compromise in order to form such power coalitions.Third, focus U.S.policy and the power coalitions on what canhurt us the most terrorism, threats to the global economy, nuclearproliferation, the environment, and global pandemics and thenjust mind other threats as best you can.Policy and power can t workwithout clearly set priorities. 298 Power RulesThe good news is that the United States and other key states havesubstantial common interests in these areas, which should facilitatecompromise and cooperation.One problem will always be with us: the strain of forging commonaction when faced with unforeseen events and with events that seemto affect certain countries more than others.Fourth, remember that international power works best againstproblems before, rather than after, they mature.This fact impliesdeveloping power coalitions early on to combat the agreed-uponand foreseeable threats.It s fashionable to argue that power fares best in crises.Thatmay be true in domestic affairs, but in international affairs, nationsbecome so entrenched in their positions during a crisis that war hashistorically been more likely than peace.The issue, obviously, is to spur common action far in advance,putting the burden on the leading nation to provide the impetus andthe proposed plans for dealing with international threats.Fifth, realize that while the essence of power remains pressureand coercion based on relative international position, in other re-spects power isn t what it used to be.The strong can t expect to command the weak the way they didin the past; the weak now can resist, and do.Traditional power doesn t work very well against today s prob-lems terrorism, poverty, tribal and religious conflicts, and climatechange because these are mostly within nations rather than be-tween nations.They re harder for power to reach.Power today must be a matter more of riding economic and diplo-matic tides rather than confronting military storms, and this meansthat power will work more slowly now than before.Economics anddiplomacy are slower processes than a military strike.All this puts a premium on whether key nations will see the newcontours of power correctly and will have the patience to give thispower the time it needs to perform.Such patience is absolutely es-sential in the twenty-first century, because nations now are both too Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense 299strong to simply roll over to demands by major powers and too weakto make concessions without time-consuming preparations.There is a natural grouping in American politics to support sucha commonsense approach a union of traditional Republican Partyrealists such as Henry Kissinger and James Baker, and Truman-Acheson Democrats such as Joseph Biden and Sam Nunn.Thesetwo groups of realists have more in common with each other thanwith most members of their own political parties.While their partyallies tend to focus on posturing for certain self-proclaimed ideals,these two groups of realists focus on solving problems with adversar-ies and allies alike by means of both diplomacy and military power.The union of these two groups of realists was exemplified in a recentbook by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Democrat, and Brent Scowcroft, aRepublican.Basically, they demonstrated that there was a comfort-able fusion of concern for power and interests, on the one hand, withlong-term implementation of American values, on the other.Thesetwo groups are natural allies in thinking, though not in politicalaction and that s been the problem.They still stick largely to theirown political kind.These realist and commonsense principles, which certainlycan be adjusted by good minds, are not self-executing.They have tobe fought for in the policy and political arenas, where the demonsand their handlers have presided.But moderate political leaders andmoderate policy experts can pick up the cudgel of common sense,and win.Moderates won the critical policy battles of the Cold War [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Butbefore the cannon fire, common sense demands a strict accounting Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense 297of alternatives and of probable consequences.Common sense adoptsdiplomatic and economic power as a means of pressuring other na-tions and to solve problems.A commonsense foreign policy boils down to five guidelines forchoosing ends and means.First, make America strong again by restoring our economic dy-namism and pragmatic, can-do spirit.Our resources and our will to help the world are the ultimatebasis of our international power.If these deteriorate, our powerabroad shrinks; it is as simple as that.To prevent this shrinkage willrequire giving far higher priority to energy independence, physicaland human infrastructure, and homeland security.The issue is whether brave new leaders will emerge to minimizeself-destructive partisanship and act together in the national interest.Second, understand clearly that mutual indispensability is thefundamental operating principle for power in the twenty-first cen-tury, meaning that the United States is the indispensable leader butneeds equally indispensable partners to succeed.In other words,succeed together or fail apart.Three points underpin this proposition: (1) the United Statesis the indispensable leader in the world and can t be replaced; (2)America s power to lead is not the power to dictate, but rather thepower to solve major international problems; and (3) America needsto form coalitions with equally indispensable partners, to add theirpower to its own.The question is whether Washington and its key partners majorglobal and regional states will show the wisdom and skills neededto compromise in order to form such power coalitions.Third, focus U.S.policy and the power coalitions on what canhurt us the most terrorism, threats to the global economy, nuclearproliferation, the environment, and global pandemics and thenjust mind other threats as best you can.Policy and power can t workwithout clearly set priorities. 298 Power RulesThe good news is that the United States and other key states havesubstantial common interests in these areas, which should facilitatecompromise and cooperation.One problem will always be with us: the strain of forging commonaction when faced with unforeseen events and with events that seemto affect certain countries more than others.Fourth, remember that international power works best againstproblems before, rather than after, they mature.This fact impliesdeveloping power coalitions early on to combat the agreed-uponand foreseeable threats.It s fashionable to argue that power fares best in crises.Thatmay be true in domestic affairs, but in international affairs, nationsbecome so entrenched in their positions during a crisis that war hashistorically been more likely than peace.The issue, obviously, is to spur common action far in advance,putting the burden on the leading nation to provide the impetus andthe proposed plans for dealing with international threats.Fifth, realize that while the essence of power remains pressureand coercion based on relative international position, in other re-spects power isn t what it used to be.The strong can t expect to command the weak the way they didin the past; the weak now can resist, and do.Traditional power doesn t work very well against today s prob-lems terrorism, poverty, tribal and religious conflicts, and climatechange because these are mostly within nations rather than be-tween nations.They re harder for power to reach.Power today must be a matter more of riding economic and diplo-matic tides rather than confronting military storms, and this meansthat power will work more slowly now than before.Economics anddiplomacy are slower processes than a military strike.All this puts a premium on whether key nations will see the newcontours of power correctly and will have the patience to give thispower the time it needs to perform.Such patience is absolutely es-sential in the twenty-first century, because nations now are both too Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense 299strong to simply roll over to demands by major powers and too weakto make concessions without time-consuming preparations.There is a natural grouping in American politics to support sucha commonsense approach a union of traditional Republican Partyrealists such as Henry Kissinger and James Baker, and Truman-Acheson Democrats such as Joseph Biden and Sam Nunn.Thesetwo groups of realists have more in common with each other thanwith most members of their own political parties.While their partyallies tend to focus on posturing for certain self-proclaimed ideals,these two groups of realists focus on solving problems with adversar-ies and allies alike by means of both diplomacy and military power.The union of these two groups of realists was exemplified in a recentbook by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Democrat, and Brent Scowcroft, aRepublican.Basically, they demonstrated that there was a comfort-able fusion of concern for power and interests, on the one hand, withlong-term implementation of American values, on the other.Thesetwo groups are natural allies in thinking, though not in politicalaction and that s been the problem.They still stick largely to theirown political kind.These realist and commonsense principles, which certainlycan be adjusted by good minds, are not self-executing.They have tobe fought for in the policy and political arenas, where the demonsand their handlers have presided.But moderate political leaders andmoderate policy experts can pick up the cudgel of common sense,and win.Moderates won the critical policy battles of the Cold War [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]