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.Knowingly, theycriticized Powell for slowing down the march to war from the inside.On August5, 2002 Powell warned Bush that he would be the proud owner of 25 millionpeople if he invaded Iraq; privately Powell and Armitage called it The PotteryBarn rule: You break it, you own it. Powell wasn t convinced that invadingIraq was necessary; his friends found him troubled, and he warned thatoccupying Iraq could prove to be very ugly.When Bush told reporters thatinvading Iraq was not the only way to deal with Iraq, Kristol and Kagan frettedthat Powell was getting to him.Responding to a New York Times story of August16,2002, which reported that leading Republicans in the State Department had begun to break ranks with Bush s Iraq policy, Kristol replied, Isn t the StateDepartment part of the Bush administration? How could its leading Republicans Powell and Armitage break ranks with the president they served? It was badenough that Scowcroft and Hagel encouraged the antiwar opposition, butPowell s background asides to reporters were much worse.Powell told theWashington Post s Jim Hoagland that Bush couldn t sustain a discussion offoreign policy beyond five minutes; Kristol replied that Powell should either help 154 IMPERIAL DESIGNSBush carry out his policy or step aside.Powell and Armitage were entitled totheir foreign policy views, but they will soon have to decide whom they wish toserve the president, or his opponents. Kristol and Kagan also demanded toknow whether the government might have prevented or better prepared for theterrorist attacks of September 11, which earned a sharp rebuke from Cheney; theBush administration had no intention of allowing an investigation on thatsubject.114By mid-September the Weekly Standard was convinced that Bush had turnedthe corner toward regime change in Iraq; the president s forceful speech at theUnited Nations heightened the pressure on Powell to support the war or resign.Fred Barnes enthused that the days of muddling along and debating the return ofarms inspectors were over.Two months later Bush had a congressionalauthorization for war and a midterm election victory that gave Republicanscontrol of the Senate and six more House seats; Kristol and Kagan observed: All that remains is to go through the motions of U.N.inspections before thepresident orders military action. Or so they hoped, while fuming that Powellhad eroded the president s position by insisting on seeking United Nationsapproval.Thanks to Powell, they protested, Bush had shifted his focus to thedisarmament of Saddam s regime, as though America could live with a disarmedand fully inspected Baathist regime in Iraq.115Kagan allowed elsewhere that Bush s strongest ally, British Prime MinisterTony Blair, had political problems that Bush was obliged to accommodate.If theUnited States had to go to the U.N.to save Blair s political skin, perhaps it had togo to the U.N.In the Weekly Standard, however, he and Kristol emphasized thatsettling for a disarmed Saddam was unacceptable.The entire inspections processwas a trap set by Powell, French President Jacques Chirac, and others whowanted to avoid a war, they protested.The threat of Saddam s regime to thecivilized world could not be eliminated without eliminating the regime itself.Even if Saddam destroyed some weapons, he could hide others; even if hedisarmed completely, he could rearm later.On the depressing side, Bushoverindulged Powell and the State Department; on the bright side, Bush was powerful and determined. Hopefully, he was just playing along with the U.N.,using it for whatever propaganda value it might bring him and Blair, while takingfor granted that he would not be handcuffed by the Security Council.116The United States had to overthrow Iraq to make the world safer, but the samething was true of North Korea.Kristol and Kagan wanted the Bushadministration to treat Kim Jong II the same way it treated Saddam Hussein.Instead of stalling on North Korea, they argued in January 2003, the UnitedStates had to confront Pyongyang about its drive for nuclear weapons.If theNorth Koreans did not back down, the United States would have to go to war,even if it was already at war in Iraq. One can t start brandishing the use of forcewithout ultimately being prepared to carry it out, they admonished [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Knowingly, theycriticized Powell for slowing down the march to war from the inside.On August5, 2002 Powell warned Bush that he would be the proud owner of 25 millionpeople if he invaded Iraq; privately Powell and Armitage called it The PotteryBarn rule: You break it, you own it. Powell wasn t convinced that invadingIraq was necessary; his friends found him troubled, and he warned thatoccupying Iraq could prove to be very ugly.When Bush told reporters thatinvading Iraq was not the only way to deal with Iraq, Kristol and Kagan frettedthat Powell was getting to him.Responding to a New York Times story of August16,2002, which reported that leading Republicans in the State Department had begun to break ranks with Bush s Iraq policy, Kristol replied, Isn t the StateDepartment part of the Bush administration? How could its leading Republicans Powell and Armitage break ranks with the president they served? It was badenough that Scowcroft and Hagel encouraged the antiwar opposition, butPowell s background asides to reporters were much worse.Powell told theWashington Post s Jim Hoagland that Bush couldn t sustain a discussion offoreign policy beyond five minutes; Kristol replied that Powell should either help 154 IMPERIAL DESIGNSBush carry out his policy or step aside.Powell and Armitage were entitled totheir foreign policy views, but they will soon have to decide whom they wish toserve the president, or his opponents. Kristol and Kagan also demanded toknow whether the government might have prevented or better prepared for theterrorist attacks of September 11, which earned a sharp rebuke from Cheney; theBush administration had no intention of allowing an investigation on thatsubject.114By mid-September the Weekly Standard was convinced that Bush had turnedthe corner toward regime change in Iraq; the president s forceful speech at theUnited Nations heightened the pressure on Powell to support the war or resign.Fred Barnes enthused that the days of muddling along and debating the return ofarms inspectors were over.Two months later Bush had a congressionalauthorization for war and a midterm election victory that gave Republicanscontrol of the Senate and six more House seats; Kristol and Kagan observed: All that remains is to go through the motions of U.N.inspections before thepresident orders military action. Or so they hoped, while fuming that Powellhad eroded the president s position by insisting on seeking United Nationsapproval.Thanks to Powell, they protested, Bush had shifted his focus to thedisarmament of Saddam s regime, as though America could live with a disarmedand fully inspected Baathist regime in Iraq.115Kagan allowed elsewhere that Bush s strongest ally, British Prime MinisterTony Blair, had political problems that Bush was obliged to accommodate.If theUnited States had to go to the U.N.to save Blair s political skin, perhaps it had togo to the U.N.In the Weekly Standard, however, he and Kristol emphasized thatsettling for a disarmed Saddam was unacceptable.The entire inspections processwas a trap set by Powell, French President Jacques Chirac, and others whowanted to avoid a war, they protested.The threat of Saddam s regime to thecivilized world could not be eliminated without eliminating the regime itself.Even if Saddam destroyed some weapons, he could hide others; even if hedisarmed completely, he could rearm later.On the depressing side, Bushoverindulged Powell and the State Department; on the bright side, Bush was powerful and determined. Hopefully, he was just playing along with the U.N.,using it for whatever propaganda value it might bring him and Blair, while takingfor granted that he would not be handcuffed by the Security Council.116The United States had to overthrow Iraq to make the world safer, but the samething was true of North Korea.Kristol and Kagan wanted the Bushadministration to treat Kim Jong II the same way it treated Saddam Hussein.Instead of stalling on North Korea, they argued in January 2003, the UnitedStates had to confront Pyongyang about its drive for nuclear weapons.If theNorth Koreans did not back down, the United States would have to go to war,even if it was already at war in Iraq. One can t start brandishing the use of forcewithout ultimately being prepared to carry it out, they admonished [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]