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. 16If Jews, Catholics, and Protestants each did their parts to undercut thecredibility and legitimacy of Soviet communism, it fell to Islam to deliverthe most damaging battlefield blows.The USSR s invasion of Afghanistan in1979 drew much of the Muslim world into the fight against communism.Italso fulfilled Eisenhower s original dream of enlisting Islamic leaders in theCold War, though in a way that he likely did not imagine.Rather than a pan-religious alliance of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim clerics joiningtogether peacefully to denounce communism, Afghan and Arab mujahadeenlaunched a jihad soon to be supported generously by Pakistani guidance,16Shultz, 163 171, and Dobrynin, 523 524.For more on the roles that Catholic and Protestantchurches played in the demise of communism in Soviet Bloc countries, see Barbara von derHeydt, Candles Behind the Wall: Heroes of the Peaceful Revolution that Shattered Communism(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1993). 320 AFTERWORDSaudi dollars, and American weapons that led to a decade of bloodshed andeventual defeat of the Soviet army.Though Afghanistan had been an Islamic nation for centuries, the moredirect antecedents to the coming clash between Islam and communism wereforged in the ideological ferment of the 1960s.Just as that decade saw Soviet-backed proselytism of Marxism flourishing among some Afghan professorsand students in Kabul, other Afghan intellectuals were embracing the works ofIslamist scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood founder Has-san el Banna.Afghanistan s previous traditions of tribal loyalties and a moresyncretistic, tolerant Islam began to be eclipsed by the foreign (and mutu-ally antagonistic) ideologies of communism and Islamism.By the late 1970s,Afghan communists and Afghan Islamists struggled for control of the nation.For a short time in 1979 an Afghan communist named Nur MohammedTuraki held power.Even his Kremlin supporters, hardly attuned to religiousmatters, worried that in his Marxist zeal Turaki was trying to push his Mus-lim country too far, too fast.Notes from a March 18, 1979 Politburo meetingreflect Moscow s ironic concern about communism s limits.Defense Min-ister Dmitri Ustinov worried that the leadership of Afghanistan did notsufficiently appreciate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. KGB chief YuriAndropov saw formidable obstacles to the march of the Marxist historicaldialectic. Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues itfaces through socialism.The economy is backward, the Islamic religion pre-dominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate.We know Lenin steaching about a revolutionary situation.Whatever situation we are talkingabout in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Increasingly worriedabout Taraki s overreach, the ostensibly anti-religious Soviet leadership evenpressured Taraki to ease up his repression of Islam and include more Muslimleaders in his government.17These sensitivities notwithstanding, in the end the Kremlin underestimatedthe strength of Islam.As Turaki grew more and more erratic in his rule, andthe Soviets saw their hoped-for client state slipping from their control, theydecided to intervene in force on Christmas day, 1979.The Russian invasion ofAfghanistan, driven in part by a misperception of the willingness of Muslims tofight in defense of their faith and their lands, contributed directly to the fall ofthe Soviet empire.The U.S.Government, starting under President Carter andaccelerating under Reagan, exploited this opportunity as well.Though modest17Quotations and background information cited in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret Historyof the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (NewYork: Penquin 2004), 38 46, 111 114. AFTERWORD 321at first in scale and scope, American aid to the Afghan fighters eventuallyreached the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.Most importantly, thissupport came to include the portable, potent Stinger missiles, which enabledotherwise primitive tribesmen on horseback to destroy the most advancedSoviet jets and helicopters, and decisively turned the battle.CIA directorCasey, a devout Catholic, exemplified one strain of American enthusiasm forthe Muslim warriors.In Steve Coll s words, as his Muslim allies did, Caseysaw the Afghan jihad not merely as statecraft, but as an important front ina worldwide struggle between communist atheism and God s communityof believers. And in a 1980s version of the Truman Administration s covertsupport for the distribution of Bishop Dibelius sermons in East Berlin, Caseyagreed to have the CIA print and distribute thousands of Uzbek-languagecopies of the Koran among Uzbek-speaking Afghans in the northern part ofthe country and even in Uzbek-speaking areas across the Soviet border.18This peculiar combination of American and Saudi funding, Stinger missiles,Islamic piety, Afghan ferocity, and CIA-printed Korans proved too much forthe Kremlin.The Soviet army s withdrawal from Afghanistan early in 1989was soon followed by the collapse of the Iron Curtain that same year, and thedemise of the Soviet Union itself two years later.Viewed through how it ended, and particularly through the roles played byJews, Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims in bringing about its end, the ColdWar s conclusion confirms the essential insight of Truman, Eisenhower, andother American leaders such as Dulles, Smith, and Judd.The Cold War was areligious war.Religion helped define the nature of the conflict, delineate thedifferent sides, and determine the outcome.And yet how these various faithsplayed their roles in the Cold War s final decades reinforces the challenges andcomplexities of its first decades.Different religious leaders and groups neverdid come together in a unified alliance against communism.Even within eachfaith, serious divisions emerged [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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. 16If Jews, Catholics, and Protestants each did their parts to undercut thecredibility and legitimacy of Soviet communism, it fell to Islam to deliverthe most damaging battlefield blows.The USSR s invasion of Afghanistan in1979 drew much of the Muslim world into the fight against communism.Italso fulfilled Eisenhower s original dream of enlisting Islamic leaders in theCold War, though in a way that he likely did not imagine.Rather than a pan-religious alliance of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim clerics joiningtogether peacefully to denounce communism, Afghan and Arab mujahadeenlaunched a jihad soon to be supported generously by Pakistani guidance,16Shultz, 163 171, and Dobrynin, 523 524.For more on the roles that Catholic and Protestantchurches played in the demise of communism in Soviet Bloc countries, see Barbara von derHeydt, Candles Behind the Wall: Heroes of the Peaceful Revolution that Shattered Communism(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1993). 320 AFTERWORDSaudi dollars, and American weapons that led to a decade of bloodshed andeventual defeat of the Soviet army.Though Afghanistan had been an Islamic nation for centuries, the moredirect antecedents to the coming clash between Islam and communism wereforged in the ideological ferment of the 1960s.Just as that decade saw Soviet-backed proselytism of Marxism flourishing among some Afghan professorsand students in Kabul, other Afghan intellectuals were embracing the works ofIslamist scholars such as Sayyid Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood founder Has-san el Banna.Afghanistan s previous traditions of tribal loyalties and a moresyncretistic, tolerant Islam began to be eclipsed by the foreign (and mutu-ally antagonistic) ideologies of communism and Islamism.By the late 1970s,Afghan communists and Afghan Islamists struggled for control of the nation.For a short time in 1979 an Afghan communist named Nur MohammedTuraki held power.Even his Kremlin supporters, hardly attuned to religiousmatters, worried that in his Marxist zeal Turaki was trying to push his Mus-lim country too far, too fast.Notes from a March 18, 1979 Politburo meetingreflect Moscow s ironic concern about communism s limits.Defense Min-ister Dmitri Ustinov worried that the leadership of Afghanistan did notsufficiently appreciate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. KGB chief YuriAndropov saw formidable obstacles to the march of the Marxist historicaldialectic. Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues itfaces through socialism.The economy is backward, the Islamic religion pre-dominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate.We know Lenin steaching about a revolutionary situation.Whatever situation we are talkingabout in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Increasingly worriedabout Taraki s overreach, the ostensibly anti-religious Soviet leadership evenpressured Taraki to ease up his repression of Islam and include more Muslimleaders in his government.17These sensitivities notwithstanding, in the end the Kremlin underestimatedthe strength of Islam.As Turaki grew more and more erratic in his rule, andthe Soviets saw their hoped-for client state slipping from their control, theydecided to intervene in force on Christmas day, 1979.The Russian invasion ofAfghanistan, driven in part by a misperception of the willingness of Muslims tofight in defense of their faith and their lands, contributed directly to the fall ofthe Soviet empire.The U.S.Government, starting under President Carter andaccelerating under Reagan, exploited this opportunity as well.Though modest17Quotations and background information cited in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret Historyof the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (NewYork: Penquin 2004), 38 46, 111 114. AFTERWORD 321at first in scale and scope, American aid to the Afghan fighters eventuallyreached the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.Most importantly, thissupport came to include the portable, potent Stinger missiles, which enabledotherwise primitive tribesmen on horseback to destroy the most advancedSoviet jets and helicopters, and decisively turned the battle.CIA directorCasey, a devout Catholic, exemplified one strain of American enthusiasm forthe Muslim warriors.In Steve Coll s words, as his Muslim allies did, Caseysaw the Afghan jihad not merely as statecraft, but as an important front ina worldwide struggle between communist atheism and God s communityof believers. And in a 1980s version of the Truman Administration s covertsupport for the distribution of Bishop Dibelius sermons in East Berlin, Caseyagreed to have the CIA print and distribute thousands of Uzbek-languagecopies of the Koran among Uzbek-speaking Afghans in the northern part ofthe country and even in Uzbek-speaking areas across the Soviet border.18This peculiar combination of American and Saudi funding, Stinger missiles,Islamic piety, Afghan ferocity, and CIA-printed Korans proved too much forthe Kremlin.The Soviet army s withdrawal from Afghanistan early in 1989was soon followed by the collapse of the Iron Curtain that same year, and thedemise of the Soviet Union itself two years later.Viewed through how it ended, and particularly through the roles played byJews, Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims in bringing about its end, the ColdWar s conclusion confirms the essential insight of Truman, Eisenhower, andother American leaders such as Dulles, Smith, and Judd.The Cold War was areligious war.Religion helped define the nature of the conflict, delineate thedifferent sides, and determine the outcome.And yet how these various faithsplayed their roles in the Cold War s final decades reinforces the challenges andcomplexities of its first decades.Different religious leaders and groups neverdid come together in a unified alliance against communism.Even within eachfaith, serious divisions emerged [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]