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.These principles were deeply ingrained in the General Somoza I came37 to know.38 Let us look at the electoral campaign, which was officially launched in 195639 and aborted with Somoza García s assassination later that year.Obviously,40 52 the somoza garcía legacy1 a guaranteed share of some public offices is insufficient for authentic, real2 oppositions they seek to form the government.Neither is impending fraud3 acceptable to them.4 The opposition formed a united umbrella organization, the Front for the5 Defense of the Republic (fdr).37 It adopted a rancorous banner: Somoza was6 accused of being a dictator and a criminal. It alleged that he was responsi-7 ble for the murder of those killed in the 1954 plot.The government responded8 to the opposition by taking some Front leaders prisoner and deporting them9 without legal trial in spite of the constitutional prohibition.38 A fair election10 was not going to take place.11 The loosely united opposition organized a campaign to pressure Somoza12 García, without foreclosing the possibility of not participating in the election[52], (213 if he were the candidate.In June 1956 the Front issued unredeemable bonds to14 finance its activities and started a series of Sunday rallies.At first the meetings15 attracted small crowds, but by mid July they grew bigger and louder everyLines: 316 week, until the last one in September, when the president was murdered, and 17 opposition protest rallies ended.This was followed by emerging consternation0.0pt18 and confusion. 19 The Somoza brothers response was rapid and violent.A state of siege wasNormal20 declared, and there were massive arrests.The central park in Leon, where thePgEnds:21 murder had taken place, was converted into a concentration camp to hold22 prisoners, and about three thousand opposition politicians were arrested all23 over the country.Military tribunals were set up to dispose of oppositionists.[52], (224 Notice that these measures implemented by General Somoza Jr.were never25 introduced by him later, in the face of the 1978 crisis.26 Until the president s shooting, opposition meetings took place; they were27 not entirely impeded nor dissolved by the National Guard.Yet the campaign28 was obstructed from progressing into full success.For example, organizers29 and individuals with campaign materials were periodically arrested.General30 Somoza Debayle mentioned to me an expression that serves to explain gov-31 ernment strategy during his father s last campaign: pruning. That is, you do32 not kill the entire tree (the opposition); you mold it so that it does not grow to33 overwhelm you; you limit its growth so that it remains a minority force.34 In spite of the increased opposition, Somoza García did not back out of35 the campaign.In total defiance, and adding insult to injury, in July he began36 transferring his military functions to his son Anastasio.by appointing him37 [first] Chief of the Air Force and [then Head] of the National Guard.This38 was made necessary because the Constitution barred from the presidency those39 persons who were on active military duty six months before the election.Since40 the election was scheduled for February [1957], the appointment of Anastasio the somoza garcía legacy 531 Somoza, Jr., was made just in time to legalize his father s nomination. 39 The2 founder was further formalizing the dynastic-family nature of the regime at3 the very moment of increased opposition.General Somoza Debayle also did4 this at the end of my mission, promoting his son in the National Guard while5 rejecting a supervised electoral solution to the crisis that sealed his overthrow.6 Thus Luis Somoza as head of the Congress assumed the presidency in 19567 amid a massive show of force to unambiguously constitute a dinastía.Neither8 was his hurried subsequent election (in February 1957) widely considered9 to have been free or fair.However, before this election, political prisoners10 had started to be released, and conversations were held with Conservatives to11 encourage them to participate.But Conservatives abstained on the grounds[Last Page]12 that a climate of terror still prevailed in the country.Parts of Nicaragua were[53], (21)13 still under martial law.14 Illustrative of one of the patterns of opposition that remained until almost15 the end of the dynasty, a small sector of the Conservatives decided to make aLines: 32716 pact with, and participate in, Luis Somoza s election for the spoils.Our source 17 pertinently comments:62.85pt18The campaign was indeed very dull.All important opposition activities had prac- 19tically ceased.The Conservative [ faction participating in the election] accepted Normal Pa20beforehand the fact that it was to be a minority (with one-third representationPgEnds: TE21insured).It was rumored that they received some money from the [government] to22put up some posters and schedule a few meetings.The biggest one was staged.23[53], (21)with no more than 300 persons in January.Finally the election took place24as scheduled.Very few people were seen at the polls, but the Electoral Tribunal25declared Luis [Somoza] elected by a majority of [88.7 percent] of the votes.and26a surprising 85.3 percent turnout.402728 The pseudo oppositions alternated with real ones during the Somoza29 years.By the time of my mission, this history of undignified opposition had30 run its course, contributing to the obsession that I found among oppositionists31 against negotiating or making a pact with Somoza, lest they be perceived32 as selling out, in an unprincipled playing the game of the dictatorship33 hacerle el juego a la dictadura.Nonetheless, in the mid 1950s, it had become34 apparent among most oppositionists that a democratic government required35 the retirement of the Somoza family from the political arena.3637383940 12343.The Golden Years5678910The founder had left his own imprint on the country s political culture and11structure.Not all was innovation fraudulent elections antedated his tenure,[First Pa12for example.Yet Anastasio Somoza García had created a new dynastic order[54], (1)13with new symbols and organizational patterns that survived his assassination.14Power was transmitted to elder son Luis Somoza Debayle, already the president15of Congress; he was backed by his brother Anastasio, the head of the NationalLines: 016Guard.But a pure replication of the earlier Somoza García regime did not 17take place: now, although under the primacy of Luis, there were two Somozas,13.0pt18and Luis s temperament was more that of a politician than a military caudillo. 19Anastasio had attended West Point; Luis had graduated from Louisiana StateShort Pa20University.PgEnds:21The assassination was followed by a wave of overreactive and retaliatory22repression [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.These principles were deeply ingrained in the General Somoza I came37 to know.38 Let us look at the electoral campaign, which was officially launched in 195639 and aborted with Somoza García s assassination later that year.Obviously,40 52 the somoza garcía legacy1 a guaranteed share of some public offices is insufficient for authentic, real2 oppositions they seek to form the government.Neither is impending fraud3 acceptable to them.4 The opposition formed a united umbrella organization, the Front for the5 Defense of the Republic (fdr).37 It adopted a rancorous banner: Somoza was6 accused of being a dictator and a criminal. It alleged that he was responsi-7 ble for the murder of those killed in the 1954 plot.The government responded8 to the opposition by taking some Front leaders prisoner and deporting them9 without legal trial in spite of the constitutional prohibition.38 A fair election10 was not going to take place.11 The loosely united opposition organized a campaign to pressure Somoza12 García, without foreclosing the possibility of not participating in the election[52], (213 if he were the candidate.In June 1956 the Front issued unredeemable bonds to14 finance its activities and started a series of Sunday rallies.At first the meetings15 attracted small crowds, but by mid July they grew bigger and louder everyLines: 316 week, until the last one in September, when the president was murdered, and 17 opposition protest rallies ended.This was followed by emerging consternation0.0pt18 and confusion. 19 The Somoza brothers response was rapid and violent.A state of siege wasNormal20 declared, and there were massive arrests.The central park in Leon, where thePgEnds:21 murder had taken place, was converted into a concentration camp to hold22 prisoners, and about three thousand opposition politicians were arrested all23 over the country.Military tribunals were set up to dispose of oppositionists.[52], (224 Notice that these measures implemented by General Somoza Jr.were never25 introduced by him later, in the face of the 1978 crisis.26 Until the president s shooting, opposition meetings took place; they were27 not entirely impeded nor dissolved by the National Guard.Yet the campaign28 was obstructed from progressing into full success.For example, organizers29 and individuals with campaign materials were periodically arrested.General30 Somoza Debayle mentioned to me an expression that serves to explain gov-31 ernment strategy during his father s last campaign: pruning. That is, you do32 not kill the entire tree (the opposition); you mold it so that it does not grow to33 overwhelm you; you limit its growth so that it remains a minority force.34 In spite of the increased opposition, Somoza García did not back out of35 the campaign.In total defiance, and adding insult to injury, in July he began36 transferring his military functions to his son Anastasio.by appointing him37 [first] Chief of the Air Force and [then Head] of the National Guard.This38 was made necessary because the Constitution barred from the presidency those39 persons who were on active military duty six months before the election.Since40 the election was scheduled for February [1957], the appointment of Anastasio the somoza garcía legacy 531 Somoza, Jr., was made just in time to legalize his father s nomination. 39 The2 founder was further formalizing the dynastic-family nature of the regime at3 the very moment of increased opposition.General Somoza Debayle also did4 this at the end of my mission, promoting his son in the National Guard while5 rejecting a supervised electoral solution to the crisis that sealed his overthrow.6 Thus Luis Somoza as head of the Congress assumed the presidency in 19567 amid a massive show of force to unambiguously constitute a dinastía.Neither8 was his hurried subsequent election (in February 1957) widely considered9 to have been free or fair.However, before this election, political prisoners10 had started to be released, and conversations were held with Conservatives to11 encourage them to participate.But Conservatives abstained on the grounds[Last Page]12 that a climate of terror still prevailed in the country.Parts of Nicaragua were[53], (21)13 still under martial law.14 Illustrative of one of the patterns of opposition that remained until almost15 the end of the dynasty, a small sector of the Conservatives decided to make aLines: 32716 pact with, and participate in, Luis Somoza s election for the spoils.Our source 17 pertinently comments:62.85pt18The campaign was indeed very dull.All important opposition activities had prac- 19tically ceased.The Conservative [ faction participating in the election] accepted Normal Pa20beforehand the fact that it was to be a minority (with one-third representationPgEnds: TE21insured).It was rumored that they received some money from the [government] to22put up some posters and schedule a few meetings.The biggest one was staged.23[53], (21)with no more than 300 persons in January.Finally the election took place24as scheduled.Very few people were seen at the polls, but the Electoral Tribunal25declared Luis [Somoza] elected by a majority of [88.7 percent] of the votes.and26a surprising 85.3 percent turnout.402728 The pseudo oppositions alternated with real ones during the Somoza29 years.By the time of my mission, this history of undignified opposition had30 run its course, contributing to the obsession that I found among oppositionists31 against negotiating or making a pact with Somoza, lest they be perceived32 as selling out, in an unprincipled playing the game of the dictatorship33 hacerle el juego a la dictadura.Nonetheless, in the mid 1950s, it had become34 apparent among most oppositionists that a democratic government required35 the retirement of the Somoza family from the political arena.3637383940 12343.The Golden Years5678910The founder had left his own imprint on the country s political culture and11structure.Not all was innovation fraudulent elections antedated his tenure,[First Pa12for example.Yet Anastasio Somoza García had created a new dynastic order[54], (1)13with new symbols and organizational patterns that survived his assassination.14Power was transmitted to elder son Luis Somoza Debayle, already the president15of Congress; he was backed by his brother Anastasio, the head of the NationalLines: 016Guard.But a pure replication of the earlier Somoza García regime did not 17take place: now, although under the primacy of Luis, there were two Somozas,13.0pt18and Luis s temperament was more that of a politician than a military caudillo. 19Anastasio had attended West Point; Luis had graduated from Louisiana StateShort Pa20University.PgEnds:21The assassination was followed by a wave of overreactive and retaliatory22repression [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]