[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.10 With French foreign and security pol-icy traditionally dominated by the Quai, or foreign ministry,any military initiative for air strikes would likely have beenblocked.11 The French air force chief of staff, Gen VincentLanata, believed that airpower could have imposed an end tothe fighting, not by threatening the Bosnian Serbs, but by giv-ing an ultimatum to the Serb leaders in Belgrade to restraintheir forces in Bosnia, or face bombing in Serbia.12 However,the French military in general viewed intervention in Bosnia asa job for the army.13 As long as the French peacekeepers in the58 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIABalkans remained vulnerable to reprisals, there was no seriousthought of conducting air strikes.14 Adm Jacques Lanxade, thechief of defense staff, ruled out the use of force in Novemberonly to do an about-face in December by speaking in favor ofeither using force in Bosnia or getting out.15 However, thisapparent change of heart did not signal a change in Frenchopposition to air strikes in Bosnia.16The British military and government appear to have goneslightly further than the French in considering the possibilityof air action.The UK s military leaders, like observers else-where, were concerned that Bosnia was the most unpropitiousenvironment for attempting limited precision air strikes.17Among the challenges to be overcome in Bosnia were its roughterrain and frequent poor weather, the lack of clear front lines,and the potential for simple countermeasures against air-power such as hiding artillery, mortars, and tanks, or placingthem near schools, hospitals, or religious buildings.18 In con-trast to the limited objective of using air strikes in support ofhumanitarian aid delivery as proposed by the Bush adminis-tration, the British military produced plans with the moreambitious aim of compelling Belgrade to stop fomenting thewar.19 Senior British officers were convinced that for airpowerto be used effectively, it would have to be used in a big way,not in small doses.20 The strategic bombing campaign envi-sioned by the UK focused on targets in Serbia proper, and exe-cuting it was within the capabilities of the Royal Air Force,provided certain intelligence, command and control, and elec-tronic warfare assets were made available through NATO.21Though the strategic air attacks were deemed politically unac-ceptable, the option was at least considered.Early USAFE PlanningSenior American Air Force officers began planning inDecember 1992 for an air campaign in the Balkans, and theyinitially modeled their plan on Gulf War air operations.Though the first plan was shelved and never implemented, ithelped to initiate a continuous cycle of US planning thatwould coexist alongside NATO efforts to enforce the no-fly zoneover Bosnia.59 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDDuring the first week of December 1992, senior officers withinthe US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) command, based atRamstein Air Base in Germany, began developing an air cam-paign plan for Bosnia.The detailed work fell to Col BobLushbaugh, chief of operations on the USAFE staff, who beganhis Air Force career by flying 200 night missions as a forwardair controller over Vietnam.22 Lushbaugh had arrived atRamstein six months before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,and during Operation Desert Storm he served as chief of stafffor Joint Task Force Proven Force (Proven Force included thequasi-independent bombing missions against Iraq conductedunder USAFE leadership from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey).23Early in December 1992, the vice commander of USAFEtasked Lushbaugh to draft a CONOPS [Concept of Operations]for an air campaign in Bosnia like we did in Desert Storm. 24A few days later when the USAFE commander approvedLushbaugh s concept for an air campaign, Lushbaugh wasassigned to work under the direction of Maj Gen James Bear Chambers, commander of the US Seventeenth Air Force.25Besides commanding an American numbered Air Force,Chambers also wore a NATO hat ; that is, his position madehim simultaneously responsible to both US and Allied author-ities.However, at this stage planning for an air campaign inBosnia was conducted strictly within US channels.26 With astrong build, and a gruff, aggressive manner, Bear Chambershad a reputation within the Air Force for possessing great tac-tical expertise [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.10 With French foreign and security pol-icy traditionally dominated by the Quai, or foreign ministry,any military initiative for air strikes would likely have beenblocked.11 The French air force chief of staff, Gen VincentLanata, believed that airpower could have imposed an end tothe fighting, not by threatening the Bosnian Serbs, but by giv-ing an ultimatum to the Serb leaders in Belgrade to restraintheir forces in Bosnia, or face bombing in Serbia.12 However,the French military in general viewed intervention in Bosnia asa job for the army.13 As long as the French peacekeepers in the58 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIABalkans remained vulnerable to reprisals, there was no seriousthought of conducting air strikes.14 Adm Jacques Lanxade, thechief of defense staff, ruled out the use of force in Novemberonly to do an about-face in December by speaking in favor ofeither using force in Bosnia or getting out.15 However, thisapparent change of heart did not signal a change in Frenchopposition to air strikes in Bosnia.16The British military and government appear to have goneslightly further than the French in considering the possibilityof air action.The UK s military leaders, like observers else-where, were concerned that Bosnia was the most unpropitiousenvironment for attempting limited precision air strikes.17Among the challenges to be overcome in Bosnia were its roughterrain and frequent poor weather, the lack of clear front lines,and the potential for simple countermeasures against air-power such as hiding artillery, mortars, and tanks, or placingthem near schools, hospitals, or religious buildings.18 In con-trast to the limited objective of using air strikes in support ofhumanitarian aid delivery as proposed by the Bush adminis-tration, the British military produced plans with the moreambitious aim of compelling Belgrade to stop fomenting thewar.19 Senior British officers were convinced that for airpowerto be used effectively, it would have to be used in a big way,not in small doses.20 The strategic bombing campaign envi-sioned by the UK focused on targets in Serbia proper, and exe-cuting it was within the capabilities of the Royal Air Force,provided certain intelligence, command and control, and elec-tronic warfare assets were made available through NATO.21Though the strategic air attacks were deemed politically unac-ceptable, the option was at least considered.Early USAFE PlanningSenior American Air Force officers began planning inDecember 1992 for an air campaign in the Balkans, and theyinitially modeled their plan on Gulf War air operations.Though the first plan was shelved and never implemented, ithelped to initiate a continuous cycle of US planning thatwould coexist alongside NATO efforts to enforce the no-fly zoneover Bosnia.59 RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDDuring the first week of December 1992, senior officers withinthe US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) command, based atRamstein Air Base in Germany, began developing an air cam-paign plan for Bosnia.The detailed work fell to Col BobLushbaugh, chief of operations on the USAFE staff, who beganhis Air Force career by flying 200 night missions as a forwardair controller over Vietnam.22 Lushbaugh had arrived atRamstein six months before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,and during Operation Desert Storm he served as chief of stafffor Joint Task Force Proven Force (Proven Force included thequasi-independent bombing missions against Iraq conductedunder USAFE leadership from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey).23Early in December 1992, the vice commander of USAFEtasked Lushbaugh to draft a CONOPS [Concept of Operations]for an air campaign in Bosnia like we did in Desert Storm. 24A few days later when the USAFE commander approvedLushbaugh s concept for an air campaign, Lushbaugh wasassigned to work under the direction of Maj Gen James Bear Chambers, commander of the US Seventeenth Air Force.25Besides commanding an American numbered Air Force,Chambers also wore a NATO hat ; that is, his position madehim simultaneously responsible to both US and Allied author-ities.However, at this stage planning for an air campaign inBosnia was conducted strictly within US channels.26 With astrong build, and a gruff, aggressive manner, Bear Chambershad a reputation within the Air Force for possessing great tac-tical expertise [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]