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.This independent emergence of new forms of pro-tection, authority and rights to wealth is a complex process in the sensethat it is greater than the individual acts of gain and redistribution thatdrive it along.In attempting to move beyond seeing conflict in terms ofaberration and collapse, David Keen has argued that war is not simplya breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternativesystem of profit, power and even protection (Keen 1998: 11).A similar position is echoed in the work of Reno (Reno 1995a) onWest Africa.Concerning the economic and political strategies pursuedby the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor during the first part of the1990s, we are asked not to prejudge these in a dismissive light as localpredation characteristic of weak or failed states.If one temporarily setsaside the brutal and coercive methods involved, on the contrary, theycan be presented as new and innovative ways of projecting politicalpower.While this may be an alarming supposition, given CharlesTaylor s victory in Liberia s 1995 elections his methods can neverthelessbe judged as successful.In relation to Taylor s earlier warlord activities,Reno asks, Does this transformed patrimonialism represent a new kindof state, an alternative institutionalisation of sovereign authority capableof defending itself and doing things without significant bureaucracies?(ibid.: 109).Political economy has provided many insights into the nature of thenew wars.At the same time, however, some of its findings have beenincorporated within development discourse.This incorporation hasbeen achieved by separating the double argument on which it is based:the idea of conflict as private gain has been accepted while its associa-tion with social transformation has been ignored.Individual acts ofappropriation or seizure can, if abstracted from their context, bepresented as a series of criminalised, short-term and self-reproducinggains.Such interpretations, for example, have been used to support theconcept of a self-perpetuating war economy (see IDC 1999; Collier1999).In this sense, one can see an important difference between thepolitical economy argument and the position of mainstream aid policy.In reducing war to sectarian economic gain, not only has the dimensionof social transformation been minimised or lost, but the opposite tendsto emerge.Collier (1999), for example, regards greedy and violent leadersas somehow locking in the characteristics of deviancy and breakdown.Criminalised leaders organise to maintain private profit and so perpet-uate conflict s aberrant social conditions.This is not social transforma-tion but rather a form of social regression.Moreover, the representationof destruction perpetuated by greed provides liberal peace with a139 Duffield 6a 24/4/07 11:47 Page 140GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW WARSmeans of delegitimising leadership and justifying intervention.Socialtransformation and actual development, however, suggest the possi-bility of a different set of outcomes.War as social transformationsuggests the emergence of new forms of rights to wealth, political legit-imacy and modes of accumulation and redistribution.Violent conflictis one part of a much wider area of actual development that lies beyondthe narrow foundation of conventional economic and political models.Its independence from the strategic complexes of liberal peace definesboth its fascination and its threat.The limits of the formal economyThere is currently a tension between viewing war in terms of aberrationand breakdown or, alternatively, as a form of social transformation.While all conflicts contain elements of both, development discourse hastended to criminalise the new wars, seeing them as retrograde, archaicand reactionary in relation to its particular vision of modernisation.From this perspective, the contribution of conflict to social transforma-tion has been marginalised.There are many indications of this.Rathersurprisingly, for example, the actors and warring parties involved inthe new wars remain underresearched.While war has been incorpo-rated into development discourse, few studies exist on actual rebelmovements and so-called weak or rogue states that might show howsuch entities function politically and economically, how they areresourced, their redistributive mechanisms, how they establish legiti-macy and authority, the forms of protection they provide, how theylink local and global networks, and so on.1 To mention just a few, onewould be hard pressed to find such work relating to the SudanesePeople s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, the Serbian state or Saddam Hussein s Iraq.In the main, aidpolicy is content with brief pathologies of deviancy and breakdown.Moreover, since the implication is that such entities are temporary ortransitional in nature, the type of research suggested above becomesunnecessary.The only legitimate question for liberal governance is howagencies should respond and how can aid be used to produce stability.The marginalisation of independent social transformation is reflectedin problems of conceptualisation.When images of aberration andcollapse predominate, it is difficult to reconcile this condition withideas relating to social change and adaptation [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.This independent emergence of new forms of pro-tection, authority and rights to wealth is a complex process in the sensethat it is greater than the individual acts of gain and redistribution thatdrive it along.In attempting to move beyond seeing conflict in terms ofaberration and collapse, David Keen has argued that war is not simplya breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternativesystem of profit, power and even protection (Keen 1998: 11).A similar position is echoed in the work of Reno (Reno 1995a) onWest Africa.Concerning the economic and political strategies pursuedby the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor during the first part of the1990s, we are asked not to prejudge these in a dismissive light as localpredation characteristic of weak or failed states.If one temporarily setsaside the brutal and coercive methods involved, on the contrary, theycan be presented as new and innovative ways of projecting politicalpower.While this may be an alarming supposition, given CharlesTaylor s victory in Liberia s 1995 elections his methods can neverthelessbe judged as successful.In relation to Taylor s earlier warlord activities,Reno asks, Does this transformed patrimonialism represent a new kindof state, an alternative institutionalisation of sovereign authority capableof defending itself and doing things without significant bureaucracies?(ibid.: 109).Political economy has provided many insights into the nature of thenew wars.At the same time, however, some of its findings have beenincorporated within development discourse.This incorporation hasbeen achieved by separating the double argument on which it is based:the idea of conflict as private gain has been accepted while its associa-tion with social transformation has been ignored.Individual acts ofappropriation or seizure can, if abstracted from their context, bepresented as a series of criminalised, short-term and self-reproducinggains.Such interpretations, for example, have been used to support theconcept of a self-perpetuating war economy (see IDC 1999; Collier1999).In this sense, one can see an important difference between thepolitical economy argument and the position of mainstream aid policy.In reducing war to sectarian economic gain, not only has the dimensionof social transformation been minimised or lost, but the opposite tendsto emerge.Collier (1999), for example, regards greedy and violent leadersas somehow locking in the characteristics of deviancy and breakdown.Criminalised leaders organise to maintain private profit and so perpet-uate conflict s aberrant social conditions.This is not social transforma-tion but rather a form of social regression.Moreover, the representationof destruction perpetuated by greed provides liberal peace with a139 Duffield 6a 24/4/07 11:47 Page 140GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW WARSmeans of delegitimising leadership and justifying intervention.Socialtransformation and actual development, however, suggest the possi-bility of a different set of outcomes.War as social transformationsuggests the emergence of new forms of rights to wealth, political legit-imacy and modes of accumulation and redistribution.Violent conflictis one part of a much wider area of actual development that lies beyondthe narrow foundation of conventional economic and political models.Its independence from the strategic complexes of liberal peace definesboth its fascination and its threat.The limits of the formal economyThere is currently a tension between viewing war in terms of aberrationand breakdown or, alternatively, as a form of social transformation.While all conflicts contain elements of both, development discourse hastended to criminalise the new wars, seeing them as retrograde, archaicand reactionary in relation to its particular vision of modernisation.From this perspective, the contribution of conflict to social transforma-tion has been marginalised.There are many indications of this.Rathersurprisingly, for example, the actors and warring parties involved inthe new wars remain underresearched.While war has been incorpo-rated into development discourse, few studies exist on actual rebelmovements and so-called weak or rogue states that might show howsuch entities function politically and economically, how they areresourced, their redistributive mechanisms, how they establish legiti-macy and authority, the forms of protection they provide, how theylink local and global networks, and so on.1 To mention just a few, onewould be hard pressed to find such work relating to the SudanesePeople s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, the Serbian state or Saddam Hussein s Iraq.In the main, aidpolicy is content with brief pathologies of deviancy and breakdown.Moreover, since the implication is that such entities are temporary ortransitional in nature, the type of research suggested above becomesunnecessary.The only legitimate question for liberal governance is howagencies should respond and how can aid be used to produce stability.The marginalisation of independent social transformation is reflectedin problems of conceptualisation.When images of aberration andcollapse predominate, it is difficult to reconcile this condition withideas relating to social change and adaptation [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]