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.For the justificationmust then involve consideration of merit, desert, effort, and so forth.To theextent to which this is done, the justification ceases to be egalitarian. 3118 Ch-05.qxd 11/13/03 2:41 PM Page 5050 Contemporary Political TheoryIf, on the other hand, the policies of redistribution and compensation donot take into account the degree of responsibility people have for beingamong the worst off, then there is no disanalogy between men, who areworst off in respect to life expectancy, and women, minorities, or the poor,who are worst off in other respects.Consistent egalitarian policies wouldthen have to aim to overcome all inequalities, and that is just what producesthe absurd policies noted above.Notes1.U.S.Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 114th ed.(Washington, D.C., 1994), p.87.2.Richard J.Arneson, Equality, in A Companion to Contemporary PoliticalPhilosophy, ed.Robert E.Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),pp.489 507, p.489.3.Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),p.28.4.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1971), pp.100 101.5.Thomas Nagel, Equality, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979), pp.106 27, pp.117 18.6.Rawls, p.83.7.Ibid., p.101.8.Ibid., p.100. 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 51Part Two:Libertarianism 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 52 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 53IntroductionThe just society, according to Rawls, is one that protects citizens basic liberties andarranges socio-economic inequalities so that they are to the greatest benefit of theleast advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditionsof fair equality of opportunity.This contrasts with the conception of justice defendedby the libertarian Robert Nozick.Justice, for Nozick, actually rules out the kind ofredistribution that Rawls envisions.In Anarchy, State, and Utopia Nozick defends theminimal state.The state should be limited to the narrow functions of protectionagainst force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts and so on (Nozick, 1974: ix).Anystate that extends its functions beyond this narrow range of functions is unjust.So,for example, the requirements of Rawls s fair equality of opportunity principle and thedifference principle would be ruled out.Such an extensive state, argues Nozick,violates people s rights.There are certain affinities between egalitarian-liberals and libertarians, namely theemphasis they place on the value of liberty.But libertarians hold that a minimal stateis the only justified state and thus reject the considerations of equality that egalitarian-liberals like Rawls invoke.Liberty and equality are, argues Nozick, incompatible.If oneis truly committed to the value of freedom then any attempt to enforce, through thecoercive apparatus of the state, a particular distributive arrangement, be it egalitar-ian or otherwise, will violate the freedom of individuals and thus be unjust.Nozick sappeal to the primacy of the value of freedom is a sophisticated appeal and the firstexcerpt from Anarchy, State, and Utopia covers the main components of his argument.Central to Nozick s argument is an appeal to moral side constraints. Side con-straints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are endsand not merely means, they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of otherends without their consent (Nozick, 1974: 30 1).Individuals are, argues Nozick,inviolable.Recall that this line of argument was also central to Rawls s rejection ofutilitarianism.By defining the right as that which maximises the good utilitarianismfails to take seriously the distinction between persons.Maximising utility might justifyviolating individual rights.But justice, argues Rawls, denies that the loss of freedomfor some is made right by a greater good shared by others.It would thus appear thatRawls and Nozick share the same starting point.But this is not so.The scope of indi-vidual freedom that Nozick appeals to is more expansive than that of Rawls.Thecentral issue that divides Rawls and Nozick is the stance they take on property rights.While Rawls does include among the basic liberties of the person the right to hold andhave the exclusive use of personal property, he does not include the wider conceptionof the right which extends this right to include certain rights of acquisition andbequest, as well as the right to own means of production and natural resources(Rawls, 1993: 298).Nozick s libertarian argument is premised on absolute propertyrights: rights of ownership over oneself and over things in the world (Wolff, 1991: 4). 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 5454 Contemporary Political TheoryIt is thus obvious why, for Nozick, freedom and equality are incompatible.If freedomincludes absolute property rights then such freedom will be limited by the egalitarianmeasures of, for example, Rawls s difference principle.The important question is shouldwe accept this wide conception of property rights? Nozick believes that such a con-ception of property rights follows from a commitment to the thesis that underlies ourcommitment to side constraints the thesis of self-ownership.This thesis states thateach person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, conse-quently, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, pro-vided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others (Cohen, 1995: 67).The so-called eye lottery example is usually invoked to illustrate the intuitive appealof the thesis of self-ownership and how it captures our concern for side constraints [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.For the justificationmust then involve consideration of merit, desert, effort, and so forth.To theextent to which this is done, the justification ceases to be egalitarian. 3118 Ch-05.qxd 11/13/03 2:41 PM Page 5050 Contemporary Political TheoryIf, on the other hand, the policies of redistribution and compensation donot take into account the degree of responsibility people have for beingamong the worst off, then there is no disanalogy between men, who areworst off in respect to life expectancy, and women, minorities, or the poor,who are worst off in other respects.Consistent egalitarian policies wouldthen have to aim to overcome all inequalities, and that is just what producesthe absurd policies noted above.Notes1.U.S.Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 114th ed.(Washington, D.C., 1994), p.87.2.Richard J.Arneson, Equality, in A Companion to Contemporary PoliticalPhilosophy, ed.Robert E.Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),pp.489 507, p.489.3.Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),p.28.4.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1971), pp.100 101.5.Thomas Nagel, Equality, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979), pp.106 27, pp.117 18.6.Rawls, p.83.7.Ibid., p.101.8.Ibid., p.100. 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 51Part Two:Libertarianism 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 52 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 53IntroductionThe just society, according to Rawls, is one that protects citizens basic liberties andarranges socio-economic inequalities so that they are to the greatest benefit of theleast advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditionsof fair equality of opportunity.This contrasts with the conception of justice defendedby the libertarian Robert Nozick.Justice, for Nozick, actually rules out the kind ofredistribution that Rawls envisions.In Anarchy, State, and Utopia Nozick defends theminimal state.The state should be limited to the narrow functions of protectionagainst force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts and so on (Nozick, 1974: ix).Anystate that extends its functions beyond this narrow range of functions is unjust.So,for example, the requirements of Rawls s fair equality of opportunity principle and thedifference principle would be ruled out.Such an extensive state, argues Nozick,violates people s rights.There are certain affinities between egalitarian-liberals and libertarians, namely theemphasis they place on the value of liberty.But libertarians hold that a minimal stateis the only justified state and thus reject the considerations of equality that egalitarian-liberals like Rawls invoke.Liberty and equality are, argues Nozick, incompatible.If oneis truly committed to the value of freedom then any attempt to enforce, through thecoercive apparatus of the state, a particular distributive arrangement, be it egalitar-ian or otherwise, will violate the freedom of individuals and thus be unjust.Nozick sappeal to the primacy of the value of freedom is a sophisticated appeal and the firstexcerpt from Anarchy, State, and Utopia covers the main components of his argument.Central to Nozick s argument is an appeal to moral side constraints. Side con-straints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are endsand not merely means, they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of otherends without their consent (Nozick, 1974: 30 1).Individuals are, argues Nozick,inviolable.Recall that this line of argument was also central to Rawls s rejection ofutilitarianism.By defining the right as that which maximises the good utilitarianismfails to take seriously the distinction between persons.Maximising utility might justifyviolating individual rights.But justice, argues Rawls, denies that the loss of freedomfor some is made right by a greater good shared by others.It would thus appear thatRawls and Nozick share the same starting point.But this is not so.The scope of indi-vidual freedom that Nozick appeals to is more expansive than that of Rawls.Thecentral issue that divides Rawls and Nozick is the stance they take on property rights.While Rawls does include among the basic liberties of the person the right to hold andhave the exclusive use of personal property, he does not include the wider conceptionof the right which extends this right to include certain rights of acquisition andbequest, as well as the right to own means of production and natural resources(Rawls, 1993: 298).Nozick s libertarian argument is premised on absolute propertyrights: rights of ownership over oneself and over things in the world (Wolff, 1991: 4). 3118 Part-02.qxd 11/13/03 9:51 AM Page 5454 Contemporary Political TheoryIt is thus obvious why, for Nozick, freedom and equality are incompatible.If freedomincludes absolute property rights then such freedom will be limited by the egalitarianmeasures of, for example, Rawls s difference principle.The important question is shouldwe accept this wide conception of property rights? Nozick believes that such a con-ception of property rights follows from a commitment to the thesis that underlies ourcommitment to side constraints the thesis of self-ownership.This thesis states thateach person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, conse-quently, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, pro-vided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others (Cohen, 1995: 67).The so-called eye lottery example is usually invoked to illustrate the intuitive appealof the thesis of self-ownership and how it captures our concern for side constraints [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]