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.General debilityor threat to life were the reasons why serious cases were released,and when Mosley s phlebitis started to spread in 1943 the medicalauthorities informed the Home Office there was a threat toMosley s life, particularly given the fact that the conditions ofinternment had already reduced his weight from 14 stone 7 lbs to11 stone 4 lbs.115It was in the light of these facts that the Cabinet decided torelease Mosley in November 1943.The Left organized a series ofdemonstrations in November and December 1943, althoughSpecial Branch argued that these were mainly planned by theCommunist party or front organizations.116 At least 21 anti-Mosley meetings in London were reported to the authorities inthe month following his release, with attendances rising to 1,300114PRO HO 45/28492/252 and 257, HO 262/6115PRO HO 45/24892/129.116PRO HO 45/24893/3 4. INTERNMENT201and several over 1,000.117 Following one demonstration an emptyquart beer bottle was delivered to the Home Secretary labelled Rat Poison and Cure for Phlebitus (sic).118 On 23 Novemberover 1,000 demonstrators yelled outside the Palace of Westminster: We ve got to get rid of the rat M-O-S-L-E-Y. 119 The governmentwas more worried by the 14 days notice of strike action at nineGlamorgan collieries over the issue, although it appears these didnot take place.120The virulence of the opposition, with London as its epicentre,reflected both the degree of popular hostility felt in the capital toMosley following the blitz, and the fact that the Communist partyhad organized tenant associations and front organizations in localcommunities, particularly in the East End.The government wereparticularly concerned about the growth of anti-semitism duringthe Second World War and the possible role fascists might have infanning its embers.121 This arose partly as a result of criticism ofalleged involvement by some Jews in black market activities.Thiswas one of the reasons why the conditional release of many fascistsdid not allow them access to the Metropolitan Police District.However, even before the end of the war there was conflict betweencommunists and ex-fascists and the meetings of Jeffrey Hamm sLeague of ex-Servicemen were to bring alive once more the ten-sions of the 1930s in parts of the East End for a short period after1945.Thus internment brought the official history of British fascismto an abrupt conclusion.The BUF and IFL were never to be reformed.Yet fascism did not die; like the leopard, it changed its spots.Itsresurrection in a greatly altered post-war world was to be achievedin revisionist forms.Few were to emerge from the sorry saga of internment with anycredit and the continuing obsession with secrecy by both theauthorities and those who suffered make a final assessment of itdifficult.What can be said, however, is that internment, whichbegan as a response to a political and military crisis in 1940 and117PRO HO 45/24893/11.118PRO HO 45/24893/6.119PRO HO 45/24893/110.120PRO HO 45/24893/114.121Aaron Goldman, The resurgence of anti-semitism in Britain during World War II ,Jewish Social Studies, 40, 1 (1984), pp.37 50. INTERNMENT202was introduced on the grounds of national security, after 1941was maintained as a political act; the purpose of internment subtlychanged from preventive detention of an arguably potential fifthcolumn to the maintenance of public morale through the punish-ment as scapegoats of those in British society who appeared toresemble most, at least superficially, the nazis and what they stoodfor.It was ironic that the Communist party, who turned from ananti-war party to super-patriots overnight in June 1941, exhibitedfar more signs of foreign control than the fascists ever did; althoughMosley had received significant finance from Mussolini for a fewyears in the 1930s, this was no more reprehensible than thefinancial support and rigid direction that Moscow had alwaysprovided for the communists.If the Zinoviev letter, whether forgedor not,122 and the funds provided for the Daily Herald suggestedattempted Moscow influence behind the British Labour move-ment, the Security Service completely failed to produce clearevidence of any close control of British fascism by the more suc-cessful European movements, at least insofar as their activities in1939 40 were concerned.122Andrew, Secret Service, pp.298 338. 8New Wine for Old Bottles,1945 1960nevitably the end of the Second World War marked a watershedIin the history of British fascism.Although fascism had not beenbanned, the use of DR 18b (1A) and DR 18AA against the BUF, andthe wholesale internment of many of the leading members of theBUF, IFL, NL, BPP and the Link, meant that the state had squashedflat the political activities of these organizations.After the waronly the BPP was to survive under the aristocratic patronage of theDuke of Bedford.Post-war revisionist fascismFor those whose faith in British fascism remained undimmed therealities of the post-war world had to be taken into account.Theexperience of 1940 and the war to the finish against Hitler hadradically altered that perspective.A new consensus had formed.State and society were hostile to all forms of political activity whichcould be seen as friendly to or influenced by nazism.Prior to theSecond World War, apart from organized labour and militantJewish movements, there had been widespread indifference to fas-cism provided that public order was not threatened.After theOlympia fiasco on 7 June 1934 the BUF was perceived by muchpublic opinion with ridicule and contempt [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.General debilityor threat to life were the reasons why serious cases were released,and when Mosley s phlebitis started to spread in 1943 the medicalauthorities informed the Home Office there was a threat toMosley s life, particularly given the fact that the conditions ofinternment had already reduced his weight from 14 stone 7 lbs to11 stone 4 lbs.115It was in the light of these facts that the Cabinet decided torelease Mosley in November 1943.The Left organized a series ofdemonstrations in November and December 1943, althoughSpecial Branch argued that these were mainly planned by theCommunist party or front organizations.116 At least 21 anti-Mosley meetings in London were reported to the authorities inthe month following his release, with attendances rising to 1,300114PRO HO 45/28492/252 and 257, HO 262/6115PRO HO 45/24892/129.116PRO HO 45/24893/3 4. INTERNMENT201and several over 1,000.117 Following one demonstration an emptyquart beer bottle was delivered to the Home Secretary labelled Rat Poison and Cure for Phlebitus (sic).118 On 23 Novemberover 1,000 demonstrators yelled outside the Palace of Westminster: We ve got to get rid of the rat M-O-S-L-E-Y. 119 The governmentwas more worried by the 14 days notice of strike action at nineGlamorgan collieries over the issue, although it appears these didnot take place.120The virulence of the opposition, with London as its epicentre,reflected both the degree of popular hostility felt in the capital toMosley following the blitz, and the fact that the Communist partyhad organized tenant associations and front organizations in localcommunities, particularly in the East End.The government wereparticularly concerned about the growth of anti-semitism duringthe Second World War and the possible role fascists might have infanning its embers.121 This arose partly as a result of criticism ofalleged involvement by some Jews in black market activities.Thiswas one of the reasons why the conditional release of many fascistsdid not allow them access to the Metropolitan Police District.However, even before the end of the war there was conflict betweencommunists and ex-fascists and the meetings of Jeffrey Hamm sLeague of ex-Servicemen were to bring alive once more the ten-sions of the 1930s in parts of the East End for a short period after1945.Thus internment brought the official history of British fascismto an abrupt conclusion.The BUF and IFL were never to be reformed.Yet fascism did not die; like the leopard, it changed its spots.Itsresurrection in a greatly altered post-war world was to be achievedin revisionist forms.Few were to emerge from the sorry saga of internment with anycredit and the continuing obsession with secrecy by both theauthorities and those who suffered make a final assessment of itdifficult.What can be said, however, is that internment, whichbegan as a response to a political and military crisis in 1940 and117PRO HO 45/24893/11.118PRO HO 45/24893/6.119PRO HO 45/24893/110.120PRO HO 45/24893/114.121Aaron Goldman, The resurgence of anti-semitism in Britain during World War II ,Jewish Social Studies, 40, 1 (1984), pp.37 50. INTERNMENT202was introduced on the grounds of national security, after 1941was maintained as a political act; the purpose of internment subtlychanged from preventive detention of an arguably potential fifthcolumn to the maintenance of public morale through the punish-ment as scapegoats of those in British society who appeared toresemble most, at least superficially, the nazis and what they stoodfor.It was ironic that the Communist party, who turned from ananti-war party to super-patriots overnight in June 1941, exhibitedfar more signs of foreign control than the fascists ever did; althoughMosley had received significant finance from Mussolini for a fewyears in the 1930s, this was no more reprehensible than thefinancial support and rigid direction that Moscow had alwaysprovided for the communists.If the Zinoviev letter, whether forgedor not,122 and the funds provided for the Daily Herald suggestedattempted Moscow influence behind the British Labour move-ment, the Security Service completely failed to produce clearevidence of any close control of British fascism by the more suc-cessful European movements, at least insofar as their activities in1939 40 were concerned.122Andrew, Secret Service, pp.298 338. 8New Wine for Old Bottles,1945 1960nevitably the end of the Second World War marked a watershedIin the history of British fascism.Although fascism had not beenbanned, the use of DR 18b (1A) and DR 18AA against the BUF, andthe wholesale internment of many of the leading members of theBUF, IFL, NL, BPP and the Link, meant that the state had squashedflat the political activities of these organizations.After the waronly the BPP was to survive under the aristocratic patronage of theDuke of Bedford.Post-war revisionist fascismFor those whose faith in British fascism remained undimmed therealities of the post-war world had to be taken into account.Theexperience of 1940 and the war to the finish against Hitler hadradically altered that perspective.A new consensus had formed.State and society were hostile to all forms of political activity whichcould be seen as friendly to or influenced by nazism.Prior to theSecond World War, apart from organized labour and militantJewish movements, there had been widespread indifference to fas-cism provided that public order was not threatened.After theOlympia fiasco on 7 June 1934 the BUF was perceived by muchpublic opinion with ridicule and contempt [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]