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.New York: Harper Row.p.351.27.H.Gardner.(2004).Changing Minds: The Art and Science of Changing OurOwn and Other People s Minds.Boston: Harvard Business School Press.p.11,14.Gardner s book provides a useful framework for thinking about how toengage in effective persuasion during a situation in which others disagree withyou.Specifically, Gardner identifies seven levers that one can use to convinceothers to reconsider their position on a subject.The book builds upon Gardner searlier work on the nature of human intelligence.See H.Gardner.(1983).Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences.New York: Basic Books.28.In Changing Minds, Gardner s description of the power of representationalredescription uses the example of the Pareto principle, and it includes graphssuch as those shown in Figure 5-2.Gardner draws his example from a bookabout the Pareto principle.See R.Koch.(1998).The 80/20 Principle.New York:Currency/Doubleday.29.K.Weick.(1984). Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems, American Psychologist.39(1): p.40 49.30.In some organizations, finger-pointing and the designation of blame crowd outlearning opportunities when failures take place.Moreover, individuals often donot want to talk about their failures, because they are embarrassed, or becausethey do not want to admit their mistakes in a public forum.For more on how toenhance tolerance of failure in organizations, see Farson and Keyes (2002).Foradditional insight as to why organizations do not learn effectively from failure,see A.Tucker and A.Edmondson.(2003). Why hospitals don t learn from fail-ures: Organizational and psychological dynamics that inhibit system change, California Management Review.45(2): p.55 72.31.Garvin.(2000).Garvin s book, Learning in Action, provides a detailed analysis ofthe U.S.Army s after-action reviews.For additional information about this learn-ing process, see D.Garvin.(1996). Putting the Learning Organization to Work, Harvard Business School Publishing Video.32.At Children s Hospital and Clinics in Minnesota, the staff has come to a similarconclusion with regard to how they conduct focused event studies lessonslearned exercises that take place after a medical accident has taken place.Thedoctors, nurses, and administrators at Children s Hospital have discovered that afocused event study must begin with a detailed mapping of the events that tookplace leading up to the accident, before people turn to a discussion of the causesof the failure.In part, staff members have come to this conclusion because eachindividual often does not know the full chain of events that took place.A similarsituation may exist with regard to a complex decision-making process.For moredetails on focused event studies at Children s Hospital, see Edmondson,Roberto, and Tucker (2002).33.Garvin.(2000).34.C.Knight.Discussion during Harvard Business School class, February 23, 2004.35.D.Garvin and M.Roberto.(2003). Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth IsraelDeaconess Medical Center. Harvard Business School Multimedia No.303-058. ENDNOTES 25936.C.Raben and J.Spencer.(1998). Confronting senior team conflict: CEOchoices. In D.Hambrick, D.Nadler, and M.Tushman (eds).NavigatingChange: How CEOs, Top Teams, and Boards Steer Transformation.Boston:Harvard Business School Press.p.188.37.Boynton and Fischer, (2002).p.1.Chapter 6 Endnotes1.M.Gendron. Beth Israel, Deaconess to merge, Boston Herald.February 24,1996.2.Editorial, Boston Globe.October 8, 1996.3.Levy s description of the merger and the subsequent problems at the hospitalleading up to his hiring are described, in his own words, in a brief paper case thataccompanies the multimedia study that David Garvin and I have developedabout the turnaround at the BIDMC.See D.Garvin and M.Roberto.(2003). Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (A), Harvard Business School Case No.303-008.4.Russo and Schoemaker (1989) employ the term debating society in their book.5.R.Charan.(2001). Conquering a culture of indecision, Harvard BusinessReview.79(4): p.74 82.6.This definition of culture has been developed by Ed Schein, an expert on thesubject who teaches at MIT s Sloan School of Management.See E.Schein.(1992).7.L.Gerstner, Jr.(2002).Who Says Elephants Can t Dance? Inside IBM s HistoricTurnaround.New York: Harper Business.8.Gerstner.(2002).p.192 193.9.The exercise of power plays a vital role in a culture of no.At IBM, the heads ofthe various business units had a great deal of power, and they could exercise it inthe nonconcur process.In some organizations, of course, power is highly cen-tralized, with a large gap between the CEO s power and that of others on thesenior team.In others, the business unit chiefs operate independent fiefdoms,control a vast amount of resources, and they have a large degree of indepen-dence.The culture of no is more likely to exist in the latter case.10.J.Pfeffer and R.Sutton.(1999). The smart-talk trap, Harvard BusinessReview.77(3): p.134 142.p.137.Interestingly, the authors argue that manage-ment education may encourage smart talk in organizations.They point out thatstudents in MBA programs are rewarded for making clever comments, and theyare especially lauded if they offer contrarian views and sharp critiques of ideaspresented in the case or by others in the class.Furthermore, Pfeffer and Suttonhighlight the fact that the students do not need to implement their ideas to besuccessful in MBA programs; they need only formulate ideas that sound smartand sophisticated. 260 WHY GREAT LEADERS DON T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER11.J.Pfeffer and R.Sutton.(1999).p.138.One interesting study that the authorscite in their article was conducted by Teresa Amabile.She found that bookreviewers who offered negative critiques were viewed by others as more intelli-gent than those who issued positive evaluations.See T.Amabile.(1983). Brilliant but cruel: Perceptions of negative evaluators, Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 19: p.146 156.12.An interesting example of smart talk may be the interaction that took placebetween the finance executives and the manufacturing and engineering man-agers at Ford in the 1950s.Ford President Robert McNamara had recruited acadre of whiz kids highly intelligent young people, with stellar academic cre-dentials, who were adept at employing sophisticated quantitative techniques toanalyze business issues [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.New York: Harper Row.p.351.27.H.Gardner.(2004).Changing Minds: The Art and Science of Changing OurOwn and Other People s Minds.Boston: Harvard Business School Press.p.11,14.Gardner s book provides a useful framework for thinking about how toengage in effective persuasion during a situation in which others disagree withyou.Specifically, Gardner identifies seven levers that one can use to convinceothers to reconsider their position on a subject.The book builds upon Gardner searlier work on the nature of human intelligence.See H.Gardner.(1983).Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences.New York: Basic Books.28.In Changing Minds, Gardner s description of the power of representationalredescription uses the example of the Pareto principle, and it includes graphssuch as those shown in Figure 5-2.Gardner draws his example from a bookabout the Pareto principle.See R.Koch.(1998).The 80/20 Principle.New York:Currency/Doubleday.29.K.Weick.(1984). Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems, American Psychologist.39(1): p.40 49.30.In some organizations, finger-pointing and the designation of blame crowd outlearning opportunities when failures take place.Moreover, individuals often donot want to talk about their failures, because they are embarrassed, or becausethey do not want to admit their mistakes in a public forum.For more on how toenhance tolerance of failure in organizations, see Farson and Keyes (2002).Foradditional insight as to why organizations do not learn effectively from failure,see A.Tucker and A.Edmondson.(2003). Why hospitals don t learn from fail-ures: Organizational and psychological dynamics that inhibit system change, California Management Review.45(2): p.55 72.31.Garvin.(2000).Garvin s book, Learning in Action, provides a detailed analysis ofthe U.S.Army s after-action reviews.For additional information about this learn-ing process, see D.Garvin.(1996). Putting the Learning Organization to Work, Harvard Business School Publishing Video.32.At Children s Hospital and Clinics in Minnesota, the staff has come to a similarconclusion with regard to how they conduct focused event studies lessonslearned exercises that take place after a medical accident has taken place.Thedoctors, nurses, and administrators at Children s Hospital have discovered that afocused event study must begin with a detailed mapping of the events that tookplace leading up to the accident, before people turn to a discussion of the causesof the failure.In part, staff members have come to this conclusion because eachindividual often does not know the full chain of events that took place.A similarsituation may exist with regard to a complex decision-making process.For moredetails on focused event studies at Children s Hospital, see Edmondson,Roberto, and Tucker (2002).33.Garvin.(2000).34.C.Knight.Discussion during Harvard Business School class, February 23, 2004.35.D.Garvin and M.Roberto.(2003). Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth IsraelDeaconess Medical Center. Harvard Business School Multimedia No.303-058. ENDNOTES 25936.C.Raben and J.Spencer.(1998). Confronting senior team conflict: CEOchoices. In D.Hambrick, D.Nadler, and M.Tushman (eds).NavigatingChange: How CEOs, Top Teams, and Boards Steer Transformation.Boston:Harvard Business School Press.p.188.37.Boynton and Fischer, (2002).p.1.Chapter 6 Endnotes1.M.Gendron. Beth Israel, Deaconess to merge, Boston Herald.February 24,1996.2.Editorial, Boston Globe.October 8, 1996.3.Levy s description of the merger and the subsequent problems at the hospitalleading up to his hiring are described, in his own words, in a brief paper case thataccompanies the multimedia study that David Garvin and I have developedabout the turnaround at the BIDMC.See D.Garvin and M.Roberto.(2003). Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (A), Harvard Business School Case No.303-008.4.Russo and Schoemaker (1989) employ the term debating society in their book.5.R.Charan.(2001). Conquering a culture of indecision, Harvard BusinessReview.79(4): p.74 82.6.This definition of culture has been developed by Ed Schein, an expert on thesubject who teaches at MIT s Sloan School of Management.See E.Schein.(1992).7.L.Gerstner, Jr.(2002).Who Says Elephants Can t Dance? Inside IBM s HistoricTurnaround.New York: Harper Business.8.Gerstner.(2002).p.192 193.9.The exercise of power plays a vital role in a culture of no.At IBM, the heads ofthe various business units had a great deal of power, and they could exercise it inthe nonconcur process.In some organizations, of course, power is highly cen-tralized, with a large gap between the CEO s power and that of others on thesenior team.In others, the business unit chiefs operate independent fiefdoms,control a vast amount of resources, and they have a large degree of indepen-dence.The culture of no is more likely to exist in the latter case.10.J.Pfeffer and R.Sutton.(1999). The smart-talk trap, Harvard BusinessReview.77(3): p.134 142.p.137.Interestingly, the authors argue that manage-ment education may encourage smart talk in organizations.They point out thatstudents in MBA programs are rewarded for making clever comments, and theyare especially lauded if they offer contrarian views and sharp critiques of ideaspresented in the case or by others in the class.Furthermore, Pfeffer and Suttonhighlight the fact that the students do not need to implement their ideas to besuccessful in MBA programs; they need only formulate ideas that sound smartand sophisticated. 260 WHY GREAT LEADERS DON T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER11.J.Pfeffer and R.Sutton.(1999).p.138.One interesting study that the authorscite in their article was conducted by Teresa Amabile.She found that bookreviewers who offered negative critiques were viewed by others as more intelli-gent than those who issued positive evaluations.See T.Amabile.(1983). Brilliant but cruel: Perceptions of negative evaluators, Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 19: p.146 156.12.An interesting example of smart talk may be the interaction that took placebetween the finance executives and the manufacturing and engineering man-agers at Ford in the 1950s.Ford President Robert McNamara had recruited acadre of whiz kids highly intelligent young people, with stellar academic cre-dentials, who were adept at employing sophisticated quantitative techniques toanalyze business issues [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]