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.Now so far as we confine ourselves to philosophical relations we find nothing in causality but contiguity, succession and constant conjunction.These are insufficient to explain the inference from cause to effect.34CAUSATIONWhat Hume suggests, however, is that this inference depends on processes he calls natural.Thus tho’ causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet ‘tis only so far as it is a natural relation and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.5Hume here gives a clue to his positive analysis.What he is suggesting is that there is a relation between causation and the mind, a relation not based on reasoning but one on which reasoning itself depends.To appreciate his point, we must recall that if we could not infer from cause to effect we could not reason about the world at all.Now what enables us to reason about the world cannot itself be the product of our reasoning.Unless we were already fitted to reason about the world, we could not have done so in the first place.Our very existence depends on our certainty about cause and effect.Nature has not trusted that to our fallible reasoning.In his positive analysis, Hume will show how the idea of causality arises not through a philosophical relation but through workings which are instinctive or natural to the mind.This will not explain the nature of causation; it will explain how our certainty about causation does not depend on our understanding its nature.BeliefHume does not reveal the details of his final analysis until section XIV.In the meantime, he deals with a number of related issues.As I have said, we shall not follow him in this but shall confine ourselves to the essential structure of his argument.It will be useful nevertheless to touch on one of the issues he raises, because it is directly related to his final analysis and because it will enable us to illustrate how he is hampered by his empiricist assumptions in making his fundamental points.After making the points we have just discussed, he turns to consider the nature of belief.His strategy in doing so is fairly clear.His aim is to show that belief has its roots in the natural workings of the mind rather than in processes of reasoning, thereby supporting his suggestion that the same will prove true of our belief in causality.The difficulty is that in describing the workings of the mind, he is confined to the categories of impression, idea and association.Once again, we must emphasize that he does not believe these categories will explain the workings of the mind.What he believes is that they will enable him to give a description of the mind which is sufficient to show that processes of reasoning are not fundamental to its workings.The trouble is that his categories are so impoverished that they will not enable him to accomplish even this limited a task.To illustrate the point, let us consider what he says about belief.35CAUSATIONHume begins by arguing that to have the idea of existence comes to the same thing as having the idea of an object.To have the idea of an object is to have the idea of it as existing.But that creates an obvious difficulty.For how does one have the idea that an object does not exist? With regard to mathematical and logical ideas, the difficulty does not arise, since the contradictory of these ideas is inconceivable.But with regard to matters of fact, the difficulty obviously does arise.On any empirical issue, we can see both sides of the issue.We can entertain the idea of an object without committing ourselves to a belief in its existence.Hume’s answer to this difficulty is that belief consists in the manner by which an idea is entertained.On the face of it, this is plausible.For example, of two people who have the idea that it is raining, one may be sure and the other unsure that it is true.They have the same idea.The difference seems to lie in the manner with which they conceive it.There is a difficulty, however, in what Hume means by manner.Thus in the case of the two who differ over whether it is raining, we should expect their difference to show itself in what they have experienced previously, in what they would affirm, in what they go on to do, and so on.It would be difficult to give a precise list but we should expect any list to contain some such items.As we have seen, however, Hume considers the mind in abstraction from all such items, confining himself to what is severely inner.Consequently it is in such terms that he must describe the manner of conceiving an idea which constitutes belief.What he concludes is that the manner of conceiving an idea consists in the force or vivacity with which it is conceived.He seems here to be referring to vividness of imagery.The one who believes the idea is the one who more vividly conceives of it in his mind.But that is surely quite implausible.For example, the man who believes the idea may not conceive very vividly what it involves.Perhaps that is why he believes it.Someone who conceives of it more vividly can see that it is doubtful.Here it is the one who does not believe whose conception is the more vivid.It is possible, however, that Hume is referring not to vividness of imagery but to some feeling of confidence which accompanies belief.The trouble is that this is equally inadequate [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Now so far as we confine ourselves to philosophical relations we find nothing in causality but contiguity, succession and constant conjunction.These are insufficient to explain the inference from cause to effect.34CAUSATIONWhat Hume suggests, however, is that this inference depends on processes he calls natural.Thus tho’ causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet ‘tis only so far as it is a natural relation and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.5Hume here gives a clue to his positive analysis.What he is suggesting is that there is a relation between causation and the mind, a relation not based on reasoning but one on which reasoning itself depends.To appreciate his point, we must recall that if we could not infer from cause to effect we could not reason about the world at all.Now what enables us to reason about the world cannot itself be the product of our reasoning.Unless we were already fitted to reason about the world, we could not have done so in the first place.Our very existence depends on our certainty about cause and effect.Nature has not trusted that to our fallible reasoning.In his positive analysis, Hume will show how the idea of causality arises not through a philosophical relation but through workings which are instinctive or natural to the mind.This will not explain the nature of causation; it will explain how our certainty about causation does not depend on our understanding its nature.BeliefHume does not reveal the details of his final analysis until section XIV.In the meantime, he deals with a number of related issues.As I have said, we shall not follow him in this but shall confine ourselves to the essential structure of his argument.It will be useful nevertheless to touch on one of the issues he raises, because it is directly related to his final analysis and because it will enable us to illustrate how he is hampered by his empiricist assumptions in making his fundamental points.After making the points we have just discussed, he turns to consider the nature of belief.His strategy in doing so is fairly clear.His aim is to show that belief has its roots in the natural workings of the mind rather than in processes of reasoning, thereby supporting his suggestion that the same will prove true of our belief in causality.The difficulty is that in describing the workings of the mind, he is confined to the categories of impression, idea and association.Once again, we must emphasize that he does not believe these categories will explain the workings of the mind.What he believes is that they will enable him to give a description of the mind which is sufficient to show that processes of reasoning are not fundamental to its workings.The trouble is that his categories are so impoverished that they will not enable him to accomplish even this limited a task.To illustrate the point, let us consider what he says about belief.35CAUSATIONHume begins by arguing that to have the idea of existence comes to the same thing as having the idea of an object.To have the idea of an object is to have the idea of it as existing.But that creates an obvious difficulty.For how does one have the idea that an object does not exist? With regard to mathematical and logical ideas, the difficulty does not arise, since the contradictory of these ideas is inconceivable.But with regard to matters of fact, the difficulty obviously does arise.On any empirical issue, we can see both sides of the issue.We can entertain the idea of an object without committing ourselves to a belief in its existence.Hume’s answer to this difficulty is that belief consists in the manner by which an idea is entertained.On the face of it, this is plausible.For example, of two people who have the idea that it is raining, one may be sure and the other unsure that it is true.They have the same idea.The difference seems to lie in the manner with which they conceive it.There is a difficulty, however, in what Hume means by manner.Thus in the case of the two who differ over whether it is raining, we should expect their difference to show itself in what they have experienced previously, in what they would affirm, in what they go on to do, and so on.It would be difficult to give a precise list but we should expect any list to contain some such items.As we have seen, however, Hume considers the mind in abstraction from all such items, confining himself to what is severely inner.Consequently it is in such terms that he must describe the manner of conceiving an idea which constitutes belief.What he concludes is that the manner of conceiving an idea consists in the force or vivacity with which it is conceived.He seems here to be referring to vividness of imagery.The one who believes the idea is the one who more vividly conceives of it in his mind.But that is surely quite implausible.For example, the man who believes the idea may not conceive very vividly what it involves.Perhaps that is why he believes it.Someone who conceives of it more vividly can see that it is doubtful.Here it is the one who does not believe whose conception is the more vivid.It is possible, however, that Hume is referring not to vividness of imagery but to some feeling of confidence which accompanies belief.The trouble is that this is equally inadequate [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]