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.Party leader KramáY served as the country s first primeminister and traveled to Paris to participate in the Paris Peace Conference.But in the 1919 elections, the National Democrats garnered only 9.6 percentof the vote, the smallest number of any of the main Czech parties.Masaryktried to delay KramáY from stepping down, and insisted on keeping theother National Democratic ministers in the government.28 KramáY, who haddistrusted Masaryk since the 1880s, suspected the president had a hand in hismisfortune.Their personal antipathy increased as the National Democratselectoral returns diminished: although the party retained influence amongCzechoslovakia s financial and industrial elite, it also moved hard to the right,worrying the Castle and adding to its distrust of Parliament.29Earlier historical depictions of Parliament as the center of Czechoslovakpolitics have been replaced with a more cynical view of parliamentary goings-on.30 Voting was compulsory and voters chose among parties, not amongindividual politicians: they could not alter the party candidate lists.Electionsseemed and to an extent, were unimportant.31 In fact, even rank-and-file members of Parliament had trouble materially influencing their partiesdevelopment after a 1919 dispute within the Social Democratic Party.TwoSocial Democrats tried to form a splinter party while retaining their seats;the party leadership argued successfully that the party should retain theseats and distribute them to other Social Democrats.This set a precedent:parliamentary mandates belonged to the party, not the individual politician.Parliamentary leaders insisted on absolute discipline.A politician votinghis conscience rather than the party line became a pariah.At best, hewould be scolded and threatened, at worst replaced.32 Internal dissenterstended to join or form rival parties, with the exception of the Agrarians,after 1921 the country s largest interwar party; the Agrarians managed toretain their left and right wings and maintain a limited degree of internalpluralism.The leaders ironclad control over their parties was mirrored in their holdon Parliament, thanks to the formation of the P%1Å‚tka.This regular, unofficial,highly secretive meeting of political party bosses determined Parliament scourse and was a formidable factor in Czech political culture.The leadersof the five largest Czech political parties began meeting informally in 1920at the suggestion of Agrarian leader Antonín `vehla, to limit the impact of64 Battle for the Castlethe chaos within the Social Democrats, and the related general strike onParliament.33 Perceptions of early parliamentary anarchy were widespread:in 1921, German deputies amused themselves by throwing stinkbombsin the Parliament, and.the Czech and Slovak parties found it easier toquarrel than to agree on constructive policies. 34 When President Masarykfell ill that year, the need for the P%1Å‚tka became all the more clear.Histo-rians have concluded that the republic s early upheavals and its relativelyinsignificant experience with parliamentary democracy made the P%1Å‚tka botha necessary stabilizing force and a source of oligarchical, unconstitutionalpower, transforming both parliament and government into a rubber stampfor P%1Å‚tka decisions.35 Also, the P%1Å‚tka s insistence on pragmatic problemsolving lessened its ability to contend with the state s pressing long-termproblems, such as full integration of Czechoslovakia s minorities and ensur-ing even-handed industrial or economic development of the state s differentregions.36Initially, Masaryk approved of the P%1Å‚tka; he also considered parliamen-tary debate raw and approved of disciplined expert leadership to bringabout compromise.37 He also trusted its members, especially the NationalDemocrat Alois Raaín, `vehla, and the National Socialist deputy chairmanJiYí StYíbrný.But the president had clearly envisioned the P%1Å‚tka s role to belimited, merely to coordinate parliamentary activity; moreover, he believedthat Parliament itself would for the most part follow the Castle s wishesand direction.This proved naive.When the P%1Å‚tka contested the president sauthority, Masaryk countered by opposing the P%1Å‚tka.Masaryk was equally concerned with parliamentary disorder during thisperiod and considered establishing a directorate of himself, Benea, and themembers of the National Committee to lead a brief dictatorship in 1919.Such a governing structure would allow for the resolution of many burningquestions. 38 Many years later, in conversation with Karel apek, Masarykclaimed that dictatorship could be more truly populist than parliamentaryrule. When the war ended, I thought: we will have a republic, but atthe beginning [it would have] dictatorial tendencies.I [was] not wor-ried [about it].Dictatorship interrupts Parliament, but makes possiblethe rule of the people; therefore it makes democracy possible. 39 In fact,suspicion of Parliament was common in the First Republic, a hangover fromCzech mistrust of the Austrian Reichsrat and Diets [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.Party leader KramáY served as the country s first primeminister and traveled to Paris to participate in the Paris Peace Conference.But in the 1919 elections, the National Democrats garnered only 9.6 percentof the vote, the smallest number of any of the main Czech parties.Masaryktried to delay KramáY from stepping down, and insisted on keeping theother National Democratic ministers in the government.28 KramáY, who haddistrusted Masaryk since the 1880s, suspected the president had a hand in hismisfortune.Their personal antipathy increased as the National Democratselectoral returns diminished: although the party retained influence amongCzechoslovakia s financial and industrial elite, it also moved hard to the right,worrying the Castle and adding to its distrust of Parliament.29Earlier historical depictions of Parliament as the center of Czechoslovakpolitics have been replaced with a more cynical view of parliamentary goings-on.30 Voting was compulsory and voters chose among parties, not amongindividual politicians: they could not alter the party candidate lists.Electionsseemed and to an extent, were unimportant.31 In fact, even rank-and-file members of Parliament had trouble materially influencing their partiesdevelopment after a 1919 dispute within the Social Democratic Party.TwoSocial Democrats tried to form a splinter party while retaining their seats;the party leadership argued successfully that the party should retain theseats and distribute them to other Social Democrats.This set a precedent:parliamentary mandates belonged to the party, not the individual politician.Parliamentary leaders insisted on absolute discipline.A politician votinghis conscience rather than the party line became a pariah.At best, hewould be scolded and threatened, at worst replaced.32 Internal dissenterstended to join or form rival parties, with the exception of the Agrarians,after 1921 the country s largest interwar party; the Agrarians managed toretain their left and right wings and maintain a limited degree of internalpluralism.The leaders ironclad control over their parties was mirrored in their holdon Parliament, thanks to the formation of the P%1Å‚tka.This regular, unofficial,highly secretive meeting of political party bosses determined Parliament scourse and was a formidable factor in Czech political culture.The leadersof the five largest Czech political parties began meeting informally in 1920at the suggestion of Agrarian leader Antonín `vehla, to limit the impact of64 Battle for the Castlethe chaos within the Social Democrats, and the related general strike onParliament.33 Perceptions of early parliamentary anarchy were widespread:in 1921, German deputies amused themselves by throwing stinkbombsin the Parliament, and.the Czech and Slovak parties found it easier toquarrel than to agree on constructive policies. 34 When President Masarykfell ill that year, the need for the P%1Å‚tka became all the more clear.Histo-rians have concluded that the republic s early upheavals and its relativelyinsignificant experience with parliamentary democracy made the P%1Å‚tka botha necessary stabilizing force and a source of oligarchical, unconstitutionalpower, transforming both parliament and government into a rubber stampfor P%1Å‚tka decisions.35 Also, the P%1Å‚tka s insistence on pragmatic problemsolving lessened its ability to contend with the state s pressing long-termproblems, such as full integration of Czechoslovakia s minorities and ensur-ing even-handed industrial or economic development of the state s differentregions.36Initially, Masaryk approved of the P%1Å‚tka; he also considered parliamen-tary debate raw and approved of disciplined expert leadership to bringabout compromise.37 He also trusted its members, especially the NationalDemocrat Alois Raaín, `vehla, and the National Socialist deputy chairmanJiYí StYíbrný.But the president had clearly envisioned the P%1Å‚tka s role to belimited, merely to coordinate parliamentary activity; moreover, he believedthat Parliament itself would for the most part follow the Castle s wishesand direction.This proved naive.When the P%1Å‚tka contested the president sauthority, Masaryk countered by opposing the P%1Å‚tka.Masaryk was equally concerned with parliamentary disorder during thisperiod and considered establishing a directorate of himself, Benea, and themembers of the National Committee to lead a brief dictatorship in 1919.Such a governing structure would allow for the resolution of many burningquestions. 38 Many years later, in conversation with Karel apek, Masarykclaimed that dictatorship could be more truly populist than parliamentaryrule. When the war ended, I thought: we will have a republic, but atthe beginning [it would have] dictatorial tendencies.I [was] not wor-ried [about it].Dictatorship interrupts Parliament, but makes possiblethe rule of the people; therefore it makes democracy possible. 39 In fact,suspicion of Parliament was common in the First Republic, a hangover fromCzech mistrust of the Austrian Reichsrat and Diets [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]