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.Here is the final, definitive text towards which all else wasaimed at but the development of which came to a halt by Russell s discovery ofits inherent contradiction; the discovery that became known as Russell s paradox.Die Grundgesetze must be its own yardstick there is nothing else because, as Dummettnotes, Frege s life was halted by this discovery (p.21).As we also have seen, Dummett s analysis of Frege s thought up to that point hasrelied heavily upon Frege s intentions to explain the properties of the texts, so muchin fact that what the texts themselves say are sometimes dismissed in favour eitherof what Frege would have said were he aware of the consequences of what he actually 100 The reading of theoretical textswas saying or of what Frege says at a later point in time.Thus, his analysis dependsto a large extent, if not wholly, upon factors external to the specific texts.At firstglance, this seems to be the case also with Russell s blow, but actually it is not.Instead,it is the properties of this one specific text, Die Grundgesetze, that put a halt to anyfurther theorization along the lines that are set in this particular text.The role ofRussell can instead if one would want to remain within the sphere of personificationsbe seen as that of a catalyst.27 Now, the difference might seem slight but, as a matterof fact, we will deal with two different explanatory structures and thus different readingapproaches between which options Dummett vacillates, the first explaining texts withthe help of external factors, the second with properties inherent to the texts themselves.And it is, to my mind, obvious that what Russell does when he delivers his blow is toshow Frege to the latter s satisfaction how the arguments put forward in Die Grundgesetze(i.e.text-inherent properties) are contradictory.These conceptual, etc., shortcomingsconstitute a de facto barrier for any further consistency in Frege s system of thought,and the question of Russell can be seen as being one of time, i.e.a question of whenthese shortcomings would become effective the contradictions were there, in thetext, only waiting for someone to discover them.This brings the question of textual autonomy to the fore.For Dummett, sometexts have a peculiar autonomy, since they are what makes it possible to say whetherFrege did or did not achieve what he intended to do (p.30).In this way they are.At the same time, this autonomy is withdrawn: later texts may help recognizingintentions behind earlier ones (pp.7, 9); later texts count more than earlier onesin so far as concepts presented in earlier texts are denied their right to exist butin the light of later distinctions or improvements ; they should only be interpretedilluminated by these refinements (pp.7, 20, 301).Thus, when certain texts say one thing and Frege s intentions (as Dummettinterprets them) say something else, Frege s intentions as realized in later textshave the upper hand, and the texts become, as we have seen, neutralized, deniedtheir self-determination, as it were.On the other hand, it is obvious that one text does say something contrary toFrege s intentions, and that that text is there more or less in its own right: DieGrundgesetze.Here, Frege s intentions are definitely vanquished.This text is allowedto speak for itself its concepts, etc.are taken for what they are.But it is in allcases not only in Die Grundgesetze, that is possible to argue that Frege s intentionshave failed him none of the texts is the final perfect one.Still, it is only thisone text that is singled out as worthy to speak for itself.This is a different wayof assessing a text than the way hitherto used by Dummett, in so far as he herereally has to take seriously the text s own properties.How to account for Dummett s change of strategy? There seems to be twointertwined reasons that lie behind the change.One reason for this switch of readingstrategies seems to be that in the case of Grundgesetze the road not only seems tobe but really is closed to any further theorization on Frege s part, while in theearlier texts a back door was left open; the conceptual apparatuses did admit furtherelaboration in different directions, and in the case they did not, the possibility The teleological mode of reading 101was always there to argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that Frege later developedhis ideas in a more fruitful direction a direction, however, that came to a haltat a certain point in this development due to its inherent impossibility (that is,in Die Grundgesetze).That is, in all the other texts, there existed the possibility torefer backwards from Die Grundgesetze and thus to create or discover ambiguities,vaguenesses, gaps, etc.that in one way or another could be said to be refined , developed or whatever in Grundgesetze.For Grundgesetze itself, what remainedwere contradictions, gaps or incoherences that could not possibly be remedied.The Fregean doors were closed.Also, and related, it seems to me that Dummett s own conceptual apparatus,just as Frege s once was, is a barrier to further theorizing.That is, he cannot withinhis erstwhile theoretical scheme deal with Frege s writings but has to substituteone type of reading for another.It is no longer possible to rely on earlier argumentslike intentions , would have , could have and the like.In the same way as Frege sconceptions put a halt to his system of thought, so it is that Dummett s conceptionhere says stop it is insufficient to deal with certain questions.Frege s intentionto produce the final text can no longer be used, since this intention as realizedin this final text was fraught with difficulties caused by properties inherent inthe theoretical project s nucleus.Here, Dummett has to respect a text in its ownright, and unity has broken down it is no longer possible to uphold when theteleological movement and the author-function ceases to play their parts.To conclude, I would like to point out that Dummett s quest for unity alsocan be detected in another way.His reading or exegetics may be looked at fromtwo intimately related angles, where the one is from the programmatic pointof view, i.e, from the point of view of how it is demonstrated to proceed whenat work,28 and the other is from the point of view of how that specific readingactivity is positioned by Dummett with respect to other alternative reading approaches.Rather interestingly, there seems to be no alternatives to Dummett s own proposal.It is as if there was only the one way of reading texts and, consequently, anydifferences of opinion that exist are explained to be due not to the reading approachin use but to a lack of understanding of the texts [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl milosnikstop.keep.pl
.Here is the final, definitive text towards which all else wasaimed at but the development of which came to a halt by Russell s discovery ofits inherent contradiction; the discovery that became known as Russell s paradox.Die Grundgesetze must be its own yardstick there is nothing else because, as Dummettnotes, Frege s life was halted by this discovery (p.21).As we also have seen, Dummett s analysis of Frege s thought up to that point hasrelied heavily upon Frege s intentions to explain the properties of the texts, so muchin fact that what the texts themselves say are sometimes dismissed in favour eitherof what Frege would have said were he aware of the consequences of what he actually 100 The reading of theoretical textswas saying or of what Frege says at a later point in time.Thus, his analysis dependsto a large extent, if not wholly, upon factors external to the specific texts.At firstglance, this seems to be the case also with Russell s blow, but actually it is not.Instead,it is the properties of this one specific text, Die Grundgesetze, that put a halt to anyfurther theorization along the lines that are set in this particular text.The role ofRussell can instead if one would want to remain within the sphere of personificationsbe seen as that of a catalyst.27 Now, the difference might seem slight but, as a matterof fact, we will deal with two different explanatory structures and thus different readingapproaches between which options Dummett vacillates, the first explaining texts withthe help of external factors, the second with properties inherent to the texts themselves.And it is, to my mind, obvious that what Russell does when he delivers his blow is toshow Frege to the latter s satisfaction how the arguments put forward in Die Grundgesetze(i.e.text-inherent properties) are contradictory.These conceptual, etc., shortcomingsconstitute a de facto barrier for any further consistency in Frege s system of thought,and the question of Russell can be seen as being one of time, i.e.a question of whenthese shortcomings would become effective the contradictions were there, in thetext, only waiting for someone to discover them.This brings the question of textual autonomy to the fore.For Dummett, sometexts have a peculiar autonomy, since they are what makes it possible to say whetherFrege did or did not achieve what he intended to do (p.30).In this way they are.At the same time, this autonomy is withdrawn: later texts may help recognizingintentions behind earlier ones (pp.7, 9); later texts count more than earlier onesin so far as concepts presented in earlier texts are denied their right to exist butin the light of later distinctions or improvements ; they should only be interpretedilluminated by these refinements (pp.7, 20, 301).Thus, when certain texts say one thing and Frege s intentions (as Dummettinterprets them) say something else, Frege s intentions as realized in later textshave the upper hand, and the texts become, as we have seen, neutralized, deniedtheir self-determination, as it were.On the other hand, it is obvious that one text does say something contrary toFrege s intentions, and that that text is there more or less in its own right: DieGrundgesetze.Here, Frege s intentions are definitely vanquished.This text is allowedto speak for itself its concepts, etc.are taken for what they are.But it is in allcases not only in Die Grundgesetze, that is possible to argue that Frege s intentionshave failed him none of the texts is the final perfect one.Still, it is only thisone text that is singled out as worthy to speak for itself.This is a different wayof assessing a text than the way hitherto used by Dummett, in so far as he herereally has to take seriously the text s own properties.How to account for Dummett s change of strategy? There seems to be twointertwined reasons that lie behind the change.One reason for this switch of readingstrategies seems to be that in the case of Grundgesetze the road not only seems tobe but really is closed to any further theorization on Frege s part, while in theearlier texts a back door was left open; the conceptual apparatuses did admit furtherelaboration in different directions, and in the case they did not, the possibility The teleological mode of reading 101was always there to argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that Frege later developedhis ideas in a more fruitful direction a direction, however, that came to a haltat a certain point in this development due to its inherent impossibility (that is,in Die Grundgesetze).That is, in all the other texts, there existed the possibility torefer backwards from Die Grundgesetze and thus to create or discover ambiguities,vaguenesses, gaps, etc.that in one way or another could be said to be refined , developed or whatever in Grundgesetze.For Grundgesetze itself, what remainedwere contradictions, gaps or incoherences that could not possibly be remedied.The Fregean doors were closed.Also, and related, it seems to me that Dummett s own conceptual apparatus,just as Frege s once was, is a barrier to further theorizing.That is, he cannot withinhis erstwhile theoretical scheme deal with Frege s writings but has to substituteone type of reading for another.It is no longer possible to rely on earlier argumentslike intentions , would have , could have and the like.In the same way as Frege sconceptions put a halt to his system of thought, so it is that Dummett s conceptionhere says stop it is insufficient to deal with certain questions.Frege s intentionto produce the final text can no longer be used, since this intention as realizedin this final text was fraught with difficulties caused by properties inherent inthe theoretical project s nucleus.Here, Dummett has to respect a text in its ownright, and unity has broken down it is no longer possible to uphold when theteleological movement and the author-function ceases to play their parts.To conclude, I would like to point out that Dummett s quest for unity alsocan be detected in another way.His reading or exegetics may be looked at fromtwo intimately related angles, where the one is from the programmatic pointof view, i.e, from the point of view of how it is demonstrated to proceed whenat work,28 and the other is from the point of view of how that specific readingactivity is positioned by Dummett with respect to other alternative reading approaches.Rather interestingly, there seems to be no alternatives to Dummett s own proposal.It is as if there was only the one way of reading texts and, consequently, anydifferences of opinion that exist are explained to be due not to the reading approachin use but to a lack of understanding of the texts [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]