[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.As one of the very top economic powers in the world, Japan clearly possesses the potential for theexercise of first-class political power.Yet it does not act on this, eschewing any aspirations for regionaldomination and preferring instead to operate under American protection.Like Great Britain in the case ofEurope, Japan prefers not to become engaged in the politics of the Asian mainland, though at least a partialreason for this is the continued hostility of many fellow Asians to any Japanese quest for a regionallypreeminent political role.This self-restrained Japanese political profile in turn permits the United States to play a central security rolein the Far East.Japan is thus not a geostrategic player, though its obvious potential for quickly becoming oneespecially if either China or America were suddenly to alter its current policies imposes on the United States aspecial obligation to carefully nurture the American-Japanese relationship.It is not Japanese foreign policy thatAmerica must watch, but it is Japan's self-restraint that America must very subtly cultivate.Any significantreduction in American-Japanese political ties would impact directly on the region's stability.The case for not listing Indonesia as a dynamic geostrategic player is easier to make.In Southeast Asia,Indonesia is the most important country, but even in the region itself, its capacity for projecting significantinfluence is limited by the relatively underdeveloped state of the Indonesian economy, its continued internalpolitical uncertainties, its dispersed archipelago, and its susceptibility to ethnic conflicts that are exacerbated bythe central role exercised in its internal financial affairs by the Chinese minority.At some point, Indonesiacould become an important obstacle to Chinese southward aspirations.That eventuality has already beenrecognized by Australia, which once feared Indonesian expansionism but lately has begun to favor closerAustralian-Indonesian security cooperation.But a period of political consolidation and continued economic:success is needed before Indonesia can be viewed as the regionally dominant actor.In contrast, India is in the process of establishing itself as a regional power and views itself as potentially amajor global player as well.It also sees itself as a rival to China.That may be a matter of overestimating itsown long-term capabilities, but India is unquestionably the most powerful South Asian state, a regional hege-mon of sorts.It is also a semisecret nuclear power, and it became one not only in order to intimidate Pakistanbut especially to balance China's possession of a nuclear arsenal.India has a geostrate-gic vision of its regionalrole, both vis-a-vis its neighbors and in the Indian Ocean.However, its ambitions at this stage only peripherallyintrude on America's Eurasian interests, and thus, as a geostrategic player, India is not at least, not to the samedegree as either Russia or China a source of geopolitical concern.Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its veryexistence as an independent country helps to transform Russia.Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasianempire.Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantlyAsian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic statesto the south.China would also be likely to oppose any restoration of Russian domination over Central Asia,given its increasing interest in the newly independent states there.However, if Moscow regains control overUkraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russiaautomatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.Ukraine's loss of independence would have immediate consequences for Central Europe, transforming Polandinto the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united Europe.Despite its limited size and small population, Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopoliticallycritical.It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.Theindependence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fullysubordinated to Moscow's control.Azerbaijan's own and very significant oil resources can also be subjected toRussian control, once Azerbaijan's independence has been nullified.An independent Azerbaijan, linked toWestern markets by pipelines that do not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a majoravenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asianrepublics.Almost as much as in the case of Ukraine, the future of Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also crucial indefining what Russia might or might not become.Turkey and Iran are engaged in establishing some degree of influence in the Caspian Sea-Central Asiaregion, exploiting the retraction of Russian power.For that reason, they might be considered as geostrategicplayers.However, both states confront serious domestic problems, and their capacity for effecting majorregional shifts in the distribution of power is limited.They are also rivals and thus tend to negate each other'sinfluence.For example, in Azerbaijan, where Turkey has gained an influential role, the Iranian posture (arisingout of concern over possible Azeri national stirrings within Iran itself) has been more helpful to the Russians.Both Turkey and Iran, however, are primarily important geopolitical pivots.Turkey stabilizes the Black Searegion, controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, still offers anantidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO.A destabilized Turkey wouldbe likely to unleash more violence in the southern Balkans, while facilitating the reimposition of Russiancontrol over the newly independent states of the Caucasus.Iran, despite the ambiguity of its attitude towardAzerbaijan, similarly provides stabilizing support for the new political diversity of Central Asia.It dominatesthe eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf, while its independence, irrespective of current Iranian hostility towardthe United States, acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian threat to American interests in the Persian Gulfregion.Finally, South Korea is a Far Eastern geopolitical pivot.Its close links to the United States enable America toshield Japan and thereby to keep Japan from becoming an independent and major military power, without anoverbearing American presence within Japan itself.Any significant change- in South Korea's status, citherthrough unification and/or through a shift into an expanding Chinese sphere of influence, would necessarilyalter dramatically America's role in the Far East, thus altering Japan's as well [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.As one of the very top economic powers in the world, Japan clearly possesses the potential for theexercise of first-class political power.Yet it does not act on this, eschewing any aspirations for regionaldomination and preferring instead to operate under American protection.Like Great Britain in the case ofEurope, Japan prefers not to become engaged in the politics of the Asian mainland, though at least a partialreason for this is the continued hostility of many fellow Asians to any Japanese quest for a regionallypreeminent political role.This self-restrained Japanese political profile in turn permits the United States to play a central security rolein the Far East.Japan is thus not a geostrategic player, though its obvious potential for quickly becoming oneespecially if either China or America were suddenly to alter its current policies imposes on the United States aspecial obligation to carefully nurture the American-Japanese relationship.It is not Japanese foreign policy thatAmerica must watch, but it is Japan's self-restraint that America must very subtly cultivate.Any significantreduction in American-Japanese political ties would impact directly on the region's stability.The case for not listing Indonesia as a dynamic geostrategic player is easier to make.In Southeast Asia,Indonesia is the most important country, but even in the region itself, its capacity for projecting significantinfluence is limited by the relatively underdeveloped state of the Indonesian economy, its continued internalpolitical uncertainties, its dispersed archipelago, and its susceptibility to ethnic conflicts that are exacerbated bythe central role exercised in its internal financial affairs by the Chinese minority.At some point, Indonesiacould become an important obstacle to Chinese southward aspirations.That eventuality has already beenrecognized by Australia, which once feared Indonesian expansionism but lately has begun to favor closerAustralian-Indonesian security cooperation.But a period of political consolidation and continued economic:success is needed before Indonesia can be viewed as the regionally dominant actor.In contrast, India is in the process of establishing itself as a regional power and views itself as potentially amajor global player as well.It also sees itself as a rival to China.That may be a matter of overestimating itsown long-term capabilities, but India is unquestionably the most powerful South Asian state, a regional hege-mon of sorts.It is also a semisecret nuclear power, and it became one not only in order to intimidate Pakistanbut especially to balance China's possession of a nuclear arsenal.India has a geostrate-gic vision of its regionalrole, both vis-a-vis its neighbors and in the Indian Ocean.However, its ambitions at this stage only peripherallyintrude on America's Eurasian interests, and thus, as a geostrategic player, India is not at least, not to the samedegree as either Russia or China a source of geopolitical concern.Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its veryexistence as an independent country helps to transform Russia.Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasianempire.Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantlyAsian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic statesto the south.China would also be likely to oppose any restoration of Russian domination over Central Asia,given its increasing interest in the newly independent states there.However, if Moscow regains control overUkraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russiaautomatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.Ukraine's loss of independence would have immediate consequences for Central Europe, transforming Polandinto the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united Europe.Despite its limited size and small population, Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopoliticallycritical.It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.Theindependence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fullysubordinated to Moscow's control.Azerbaijan's own and very significant oil resources can also be subjected toRussian control, once Azerbaijan's independence has been nullified.An independent Azerbaijan, linked toWestern markets by pipelines that do not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a majoravenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asianrepublics.Almost as much as in the case of Ukraine, the future of Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also crucial indefining what Russia might or might not become.Turkey and Iran are engaged in establishing some degree of influence in the Caspian Sea-Central Asiaregion, exploiting the retraction of Russian power.For that reason, they might be considered as geostrategicplayers.However, both states confront serious domestic problems, and their capacity for effecting majorregional shifts in the distribution of power is limited.They are also rivals and thus tend to negate each other'sinfluence.For example, in Azerbaijan, where Turkey has gained an influential role, the Iranian posture (arisingout of concern over possible Azeri national stirrings within Iran itself) has been more helpful to the Russians.Both Turkey and Iran, however, are primarily important geopolitical pivots.Turkey stabilizes the Black Searegion, controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, still offers anantidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO.A destabilized Turkey wouldbe likely to unleash more violence in the southern Balkans, while facilitating the reimposition of Russiancontrol over the newly independent states of the Caucasus.Iran, despite the ambiguity of its attitude towardAzerbaijan, similarly provides stabilizing support for the new political diversity of Central Asia.It dominatesthe eastern shoreline of the Persian Gulf, while its independence, irrespective of current Iranian hostility towardthe United States, acts as a barrier to any long-term Russian threat to American interests in the Persian Gulfregion.Finally, South Korea is a Far Eastern geopolitical pivot.Its close links to the United States enable America toshield Japan and thereby to keep Japan from becoming an independent and major military power, without anoverbearing American presence within Japan itself.Any significant change- in South Korea's status, citherthrough unification and/or through a shift into an expanding Chinese sphere of influence, would necessarilyalter dramatically America's role in the Far East, thus altering Japan's as well [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]